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New York City's Watershed Agreement: A
Lesson in Sharing Responsibility
MICHAEL C. FINNEGAN*
I. Supplying Water for New York City
A. Introduction
Every once in a while something happens to demonstrate
the powers of firm political leadership coupled with the
good will of ordinary citizens. A case in point is the agree-
ment announced yesterday between New York City and
upstate communities to clean up the two thousand square
mile watershed that supplies drinking water to seven mil-
lion city dwellers and one million suburbanites.'
* Michael C. Finnegan was appointed Counsel to the Governor on Janu-
ary 1, 1995. In this position, Mr. Finnegan is a key advisor to the Governor in
all legislative, legal and policy matters.
Mr. Finnegan graduated from Siena College, where he is currently an ad-
junct professor, and earned his law degree from Pace University Law School.
He was a former partner in the firm Plunkett and Jaffe, P.C. where he concen-
trated on public finance real estate and environmental law.
During his first year as Counsel to the Governor, Mr. Finnegan successfully
brokered the New York City Watershed Agreement by leading negotiations
among state, federal and New York City governments, representatives of eight
upstate counties and the environmental community to produce a landmark
agreement which had eluded the parties for more than a generation.
Mr. Finnegan also conceived and drafted Governor Pataki's Clean Water/
Clean Air Bond Act through which will be provided over $5 billion in project
financing for environmental protection across New York State. Mr. Finnegan
took a leave of absence to serve as Executive Director and Co-Chairman of the
Bond Act Campaign Committee where he managed the campaign to a surpris-
ing overwhelming victory. The Clean Water/Clean Air Bond Act and the New
York City Watershed Agreement have been hailed as the Governor's finest envi-
ronmental accomplishments.
Mr. Finnegan is well-versed in Irish politics, history and tradition and lives
in Garrison, New York with his wife and their three children.
1. At Last, a Watershed Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1995, at A28.
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So heralded the New York Times in its editorial, Novem-
ber 3, 1995, in describing both the process and the substance
of the historic ten-year, $1.4 billion agreement to protect the
water supply of approximately nine million New Yorkers. 2
The unorthodox process which produced an agreement in
principle in seven months and a final Memorandum of Agree-
ment fourteen months thereafter ended more than a century
of upstate-downstate hostility over conflicting rights to prop-
erty and water.3 It represents a model approach to environ-
mental dispute resolution.
The New York City Watershed (Watershed)4 encom-
passes two thousand square miles and is the largest un-
filtered surface drinking water supply in the country,
perhaps, even the world.5 It supplies 1.4 billion gallons of
water to nine million people each day. The Watershed region
is home to more than 230,000 people, the highest population
density of any other large unfiltered watershed in the coun-
try. As such, it is also the site of significant economic activity
including manufacturing, construction and agriculture. 6
However, only a small percentage of watershed land is actu-
ally owned by New York City; 6.4% in the Catskill, Delaware
and Croton systems.7 As a result, New York City's Water-
shed is confronted with many more management problems
2. See id. See also Andrew C. Revkin, Chasing a Deal on Water With a
Few Pitchers of Beer, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1995, at §1, 41.; NATURAL RESOURCES
DEFENSE COUNCIL, A GUIDE TO NEW YORK CrrIYs RESERVOIRS AND THEIR WATER-
SHEDS iii (1993) [hereinafter NRDC REPORT]. "In July 1993, when the ther-
mometer hit 100', New York City's reservoirs provided over 2 billion gallons of
water on a single day." Id.
3. See NRDC REPORT, supra note 2, at iii.
4. Watershed can be defined as "the area of land that drains into a particu-
lar body of water." Id. at ix.
5. See NEW YORK CITY DEP'T ENVTL. PROTECTION, FINAL GENERIC ENVIRON-
MENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE PROPOSED WATERSHED REGULATIONS FOR
THE PROTECTION FROM CONTAMINATION, DEGRADATION, AND POLLUTION OF THE
NEW YORK CITY WATER SUPPLY AND ITS SOURCES II-1 (Nov. 1993) [hereinafter
FGEIS].
6. See generally FGEIS, supra note 5, at VII.A.2-5 to 2-32.
7. See Committee on Environmental Law, Regulation of Surface Drinking
Water Supplies: How Will New York City Compare?, 51 RECORD ASS'N BAR CITY
OF NEW YORK, 521, 526 (1996).
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than any other large municipal watershed, including San
Francisco, 8 Portland,9 Seattle, 10 and Boston."
Pursuant to a series of unique state legislative enact-
ments, the City has the authority to regulate land use outside
8. San Francisco, which derives 85 percent of its water from the Hetch-
Hetchy reservoir and is entirely located in Yosemite National Park, serves 2.3
million customers and has virtually no residential development with which to
cope. See San Francisco water Department Application for Hetch-Hetchy Res-
ervoir Filtration Avoidance, June 2, 1993, at 1, 9 (on file with author). The
watershed is owned and controlled by the U.S. National Park Service which
closely circumscribes use within. See id. at 1. Indeed, as the San Francisco
Water District stated in 1993, "[t]he watershed is remote, seasonally inaccessi-
ble and intensively managed by the Park Service and produces high quality
water that is exposed to minimal contamination." Id. at 9.
9. Portland's watershed is devoid of permanent settlement and is closed to
public entry and domestic grazing. See City of Portland Bureau of Water
Works, Source Protection Program for the Bull Run Watershed 1-2 (Dec. 1,
1991)(unpublished manuscript on file with author). Serving over 700,000 resi-
dents, the Bull Run watershed's 106 square miles of drainage basin and forty-
two square miles of buffer zone, see id., and is dramatically smaller than New
York City's 1,900-plus square miles. Approximately 96% of the land is owned
and managed by the U.S. Forest Service, and the remaining 4% is owned by the
Portland Water Bureau. See id. Access to the watershed is permitted for "two
general uses: 1) research that is necessary to better understand relationships
among land use, natural processes, and water quality in the watershed; and 2)
tours designed to inform the public about the watershed management pro-
gram." Id. at 2.
10. Seattle's watershed is 141 square miles and is located about sixteen
miles east of Seattle and serves 1.1 million citizens. See RICHARD W. ROBBINS
ET AL., EFFECTIVE WATERSHED MANAGEMENT FOR SURFACE WATER SUPPLIES 379
(American Water Works Ass'n Research Foundation 1991). The City of Seattle,
which owns 81% of the land in the watershed, is scheduled to own all of its
watershed land by 2010 pursuant to the Cedar River Logging Agreement. See
id. Timber harvesting has been the major secondary-use of city owned land but
will be phased out by 2010. See id. There is no residential or industrial activity
and permission to enter the watershed is granted only for those purposes ap-
proved by the city. See id. at 383.
11. Boston derives its water from the Quabbin Reservoir, Ware River, and
the Wachusett Reservoir. See Committee on Environmental Law, supra note 7,
at 529. Serving 2.5 million customers, its drainage area is approximately 392
square miles. See id. The Metropolitan District Commission (MDC), which ad-
ministers the watershed, owns 67% of the Quabbin watershed, 30% of the Ware
watershed, and 14% of the Wachusett watershed. See id. MDC is implement-
ing buffer zone restrictions around reservoirs and tributaries, bans on storage
and disposal of harmful materials, septic system installation limitations, and
restrictions on construction activities deleterious to water quality. See id. at
530.
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its jurisdictional boundaries. 12 For more than a century, it
has "flooded fields, dug up cemeteries and condemned vil-
lages" in the upstate region to make way for its expanding
water-supply system. 13 In a classic conflict with New York
State's local government "Home Rule" tradition,' 4 the City's
power to regulate development around the reservoirs was
deeply resented by upstaters causing a rift between the two
regions for more than a century. 15
The increasing presence of people living and working in
the Watershed has produced unique challenges for drinking
water protection. As the population increased so did the need
for enhanced protections. A crisis was bound to result, and it
did.
Within the Watershed region, 128,000 septic tanks can
be found, thousands of acres of farmland, hundreds of miles
of roadways, and 100 sewage treatment plants.' 6 All of them
discharge treated wastewater into waterbodies feeding the
reservoirs.' 7 Many required upgrading or replacement ac-
cording to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and
environmentalists.' 8 By the 1980s, as result of "decades of
careless development, inadequate pollution controls and vir-
tually non-existent enforcement of regulations," one third of
the water supply was borderline in quality.' 9
Although New York City has successfully avoided filtra-
tion for 90% of its water supply as a result of the Watershed
Agreement which is the subject of this Article,20 it was only
after circumstances reached a terrible crisis that a Water-
shed Protection Plan justifying filtration avoidance could be
12. See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
13. Revkin, Chasing a Deal, supra note 2, § 1, at 41. See also NRDC RE-
PORT, supra note 2, at iii.
14. See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
15. See Revkin, Chasing a Deal, supra note 2, § 1, at 41.
16. See Governor Pataki's Watershed, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1995, at A14.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. DAVID K. GORDON & ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR., The Legend of City Water:
Recommendations for Rescuing the New York City Water Supply 1 (1991).
20. See Andrew C. Revkin, New York City Sued by U.S. On Water Filtration
Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1997, at B4.
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crafted. In 1989, the EPA ordered the City to protect the Wa-
tershed or build a filtration plant estimated at the time to
cost between $4 billion and $6 billion.21 The ensuing at-
tempts by the City from 1990 to 1993 to control land use22
enraged upstate residents, galvanizing their opposition and
resulted in a series of lawsuits that effectively blocked efforts
to protect the Watershed. 23
Thus the stage was set and the battle joined on many
fronts. The City's drinking water had to be protected for the
present and the future generations. So did the economic via-
bility of the Watershed communities. The stakes were high.
The historic animosities were almost insurmountable. And
as discussed at length in Part II of this Article, the existing
regulatory and statutory frameworks, combined with recent
case law, produced a balance of power that ensured deadlock.
So too did the political balance of power in state government
where one house of the Legislature was dominated by the
City's Democrats and the other by upstate Republicans. The
battle that unfolded had many dimensions. That an agree-
ment was yielded amazes even the writer. It also confirmed
that "compromise," a bedrock principle for our American de-
mocracy, is indeed still possible, even in this day of sound-
bite debate and "take no prisoners" negotiations. This Article
is an examination of the City's tortured water supply history,
why Watershed protections were necessary, to what the par-
ties agreed, how the agreement was developed, and why it is
important.
B. A Demographic Overview
The New York City Watershed, with a total storage ca-
pacity of approximately 550 billion gallons, is roughly the size
of Delaware. It is comprised of three separate reservoir sys-
tems, the Croton,24 the Delaware, 25 and the Catskill,26 which
21. See A Watershed Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1996, at A18.
22. See infra notes 72-191 and accompanying text.
23. At Last, A Watershed Agreement, supra note 1, at A28.
24. The Croton System, located approximately 45 miles north of lower Man-
hattan, commenced operation in 1842 and consists of thirteen reservoirs and
three controlled lakes on the Croton River, its three branches (West Branch,
1997]
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include nineteen reservoirs and three controlled lakes located
north and northwest of the City.27 The 95% gravity fed sy-
phon system28 was based on the ingenious Greek design for
the City of Pergamon in Asia Minor which was constructed
over two thousand years ago.29 At the time of its construc-
tion, the 130 miles of aqueducts and pipes plunging at one
Croton Falls, and Muscoot) and three other tributaries. The Croton normally
provides approximately ten percent of the City's daily water supply and can
provide substantially more of the daily water supply during drought conditions.
The watershed which supplies the Croton System has an area of 375 square
miles which is now extensively developed. Due to the density of the population
and the impacts related thereto, the quality of the water in the Croton System
does not consistently meet turbidity and color standards. In 1992, a stipulation
entered into by the City, New York State Department of Health (DOH) and
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) mandated that a full-scale water
treatment plant be constructed for the Croton System. See FGEIS, supra note
5, at 11-3, Il-11.
25. The Delaware System, located approximately one hundred twenty-five
miles north of lower Manhattan, commenced operation is 1950, and consists of
three reservoirs, the Cannonsville Reservoir (formed by the Cannonsville Dam
on the West Branch of the Delaware River), the Pepacton Reservoir (formed by
the Downsville Dam across the East Branch of the Delaware River), and the
Neversink Reservoir (formed by the Neversink Dam across the Neversink
River, a tributary of the Delaware River). The Delaware System which pro-
vides approximately fifty percent of the City's daily water supply was designed
and built with various interconnections which permit water from one system to
flow into another to mitigate localized droughts and to take advantage of any
excess water in any of the three watersheds. The watershed which supplies the
Delaware System is sparsely populated and continues to demonstrate a high
degree of reliability after fifty-five years of continuous service. See FGEIS,
supra note 5, at 11-4 to 11-6, II-11.
26. The Catskill System, located approximately one hundred miles north of
lower Manhattan and thirty five miles west of the Hudson River, commenced
operation between 1915 and 1927, consists of three reservoirs, the Schoharie
Reservoir (formed by the Gilboa dam across Schoharie Creek), the Ashokan
Reservoir (formed by the Ashokan Dam across the Esopus Creek) and the Ken-
sico Reservoir (which serves as a balancing reservoir for the both the Catskill
and the Delaware Systems). The Catskill System's two watershed areas, the
Esopus and the Schoharie Creek, have an area of two hundred fifty seven and
three hundred fourteen square miles respectively, and are sparsely populated.
Because of the quality of the System's water and the long retention in the reser-
voirs, there has been no necessity to filter water from the System to reduce
bacterial content and the turbidity. See FGEIS, supra note 5, at 11-3 to 11-4, II-
11.
27. See FGEIS, supra note 5, at II-1.
28. See id. at 11-2.
29. See id.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/6
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point more than 1100 feet under the Hudson River was con-
sidered the greatest engineering achievement of its kind in
the world. 30 The Watershed spans all or parts of eight coun-
ties, sixty towns, one city, and eleven incorporated villages on
both the east and west sides of the Hudson River.31
In addition to its physical size, the Watershed has a
higher population density than other large, unfiltered water-
sheds. Its population has increased 7% during the 1980s and
is now home to 459,000 people. 32 The so called "east of Hud-
son" area of the Watershed (largely comprised of the Croton
System) lies in parts of Westchester, 3 Putnam,34 and Dutch-
ess 35 Counties and supplies about 10% of the City's drinking
water.36 Due to a number of factors, the Croton System will
be filtered as a result of an agreement reached between the
City, state and federal Government.37 The so called "west of
30. See NRDC REPORT, supra note 2, at iii.
31. See FGEIS, supra note 5, at 11-15. In addition, a small portion of west-
ern Fairfield, Connecticut, is located within the Watershed, See id. at II-l.
32. See id. at VII.B.1-2. 121,997 live in the Watershed located west of the
Hudson River and 337,443 live in the Watershed located east of the Hudson
River. See id.
33. Westchester County is located in the southern half of the east of Hud-
son Watershed. Its total area is 288,000 acres, of which approximately 40%
(112,489 acres) is within the New York City Watershed. See id. at 11-3, 11-4.
Over half of the east of Hudson population is in Westchester County. See id.
Although Westchester County is the most developed and the most populated of
the eight Watershed counties, the drainage basin is advantageously located in
the north, which is the least developed portion of the County. See id. at VII.A.1-
13. In 1990, the population of the Watershed portion of Westchester County
was 224,249. See id. at Table VII.B.1-1.
34. Putnam County is located directly to the north of Westchester on the
east side of the Hudson. See id. at VII.A.1-14. Putnam County's total area is
approximately 157,158 acres, of which about 54% (84,384 acres) lies within the
Watershed. See id. In 1990, Putnam's Watershed population was 74,699. See
id. at Table VII.B.1-1.
35. North of Putnam County, Dutchess County has a total area of 529,119
acres, with only 3.8% (20,242 acres) lying in the New York City Watershed. See
id. at VII.A. 1-16. In 1990, Dutchess County had a population of 38,495. See id.
at Table VII.B.1-1.
36. See FGEIS supra note 5, at 11-3.
37. See id. at II-11. At this writing, EPA has commenced an action against
New York City to compel agreement to filter by a date certain in a location to be
determined by the parties no later than 2007. EPA is also demanding that New
York City pay penalties for past violations. See Andrew C. Revkin, E.P.A.
Presses City on Water Filtration Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1997, at B3.
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Hudson" area lies wholly or partly within Delaware, 38
Greene,39 Schoharie, 4° Sullivan4 l and Ulster 42 Counties and
is home to the Catskill and Delaware Systems which provide
approximately 90% of the City's drinking water.43
The New York City Watershed is a living watershed and
a location for significant economic activity. In the 1990 cen-
sus, 22,086 manufacturing jobs were identified in the five
west of Hudson counties.44 In addition, 11,089 construction
jobs were also identified.45 Agriculture, which accounts for a
relatively small number of jobs, remains important in the
Catskill and Delaware regions. 46
38. Delaware County, which is home to the Pepacton and Cannonsville Res-
ervoirs, is located in the western section of the west of Hudson watershed. See
NRDC REPORT, supra note 2, at 12, 19. Delaware County is one of the most
significant sources of water in the entire Watershed, see id., with a total area of
1468 square miles (939,520 acres), 55% of which (516,224 acres) lies within the
Watershed. See FGEIS, supra note 5, at Table VII.B.1-1. In 1990, Delaware
County's Watershed population was 41,403. See id.
39. Located in the northeast section of the west of Hudson watershed,
Greene County's total area is 653 square miles (417,920 acres) of which 45%
(186,243 acres) is within the Watershed. See FGEIS, supra, note 5, at VII.A. 1-
6. In 1990, Greene County had a population of 7332. See id. at Table VII.B.1-1.
40. Schoharie County is located at the northern end of the west of Hudson
watershed and includes a portion of the Schoharie Reservoir. See id. at VII.A.1-
8. Only 41,704 acres of Schoharie County lie within the Watershed. See id. In
1990, Schoharie County had a population of approximately 4000 people. See id.
at Table VII.B.1-1.
41. Located in the southwestern portion of the west of Hudson watershed,
Sullivan County has a total area of 1011 square miles (647,040 acres) of which
less than 7% (42,550 acres) are within the Watershed. See id. at VII.A. 1-9. The
Neversink Reservoir and a part of the Rondout Reservoir are located within the
County. See id. In 1990, Sullivan County had a population of 24,221. See id. at
Table VII.B.1-1.
42. Home to the Ashokan Reservoir, Ulster County is located in the south-
ern portion of the west of Hudson watershed. See id. at VII.A.1-10. Ulster
County has a total area of 1142 square miles (730,880 acres) and 29% (215,262
acres) of the County lies within the Watershed. See id. In 1990, Ulster County
had a population of 45,034. See id. Table VII.B.1-1.
43. See id. at 11-3, 11-4.
44. See FGEIS, supra note 5, at Table VII.B.2-2.
45. See id.
46. See NEW YORK STATE WATER RESOURCES INSTITUTE, WHOLE FARM PLAN-
NING: WATERSHED AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM 2 (1996) [hereinafter WHOLE FARM
PLANNING). Agriculture in the Watershed west of the Hudson accounts for




Overall, 90,614 manufacturing jobs were identified in
1990 in the east of Hudson counties. 47 Of these, over 57,000
were located in Westchester. 48 The census also identified
42,456 construction jobs,49 and 7,695 agricultural jobs.50
The fact that the New York City Watershed is indeed a
"living" watershed presents unique challenges not found in
any of the larger unfiltered water supply system in the na-
tion.51 Microbial contaminants and eutrophication due to
sewage and septic system discharges and various types of
runoff (from lawns, farms, highways, etc.) constitute the ma-
jor threats to drinking water.52
The Watershed is more than a hydrologically and eco-
nomically significant part of the State which collects water to
accommodate the daily need of more than half the State's
population. It has alternately been a political battleground, a
source of great human pain for dislocated families, and has
areas of extreme poverty and social/economic isolation.
While there are many significant watersheds in a state as
vast as New York, "The Watershed" immediately identifies
only one, a region in the Catskill Mountains and Hudson Val-
ley which has been at the center of one of the most enduring
and important issues in New York history.
The history of the New York City drinking water supply
is the history of the struggle between property rights and
public health protections, urban sophistication and rural sim-
plicity, water consumers versus watershed residents, and the




51. See NRDC REPORT, supra note 2, at v. The more developed, east of
Hudson Croton system, where the Diverting and Croton Falls reservoirs have
highly developed, heavily populated watersheds, the water is of comparatively
low quality, whereas the Delaware system's Neversink Reservoir, with "the
least developed and most sparsely populated watershed, boasts the finest raw
water quality in the City's entire reservoir system." Id. at v.
52. See id. Giardia and Cryptosporidium, which are two microbial agents
of increasing concern in water supplies, have not been linked to waterborne
disease in New York City. See id. Nor does there appear to be a significant
problem from toxic chemical contaminants (i.e. pesticides or petroleum prod-
ucts) at this time. See id.
1997] 585
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now centuries old political struggle between upstate and
downstate. The central characters have included such nota-
ble figures as Alexander Hamilton, Aaron Burr, Boss Tweed
and Teddy Roosevelt. 53 The following section examines the
historical roots of the ancient animosities that played such a
prominent part in precipitating the modern crisis in New
York's effort to supply itself with drinking water.
C. Historical Overview
From the moment Peter Minuit "purchased" Manhattan
Island for beads and trinkets in 1626, New York City has
faced water supply problems.5 4 Surrounded by brackish riv-
ers that were unsuitable for consumption, Manhattan Island
provided its early inhabitants fresh water from underground
springs and surface ponds. 55
Water was drawn from either privately owned wells or
publicly maintained "draws," typically situated on street cor-
ners.56 Cisterns for catching rainwater were also popular,
but were obviously dependent on the caprice of the weather. 57
These sources of water were adequate for almost the first cen-
tury of European settlement of Manhattan Island but grew
increasingly untenable as the population continued to ex-
pand.58 However, as early as 1750, water drawn from the
public wells sparked bitter complaints about its odor and
appearance. 59
Another important source of the early Manhattan water
supply was the "Collect".60 Originally a superior source of
53. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
54. See CHARLES H. WEIDNER, WATER FOR A CITY: A HISTORY OF NEW YORK
CITY'S PROBLEM FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE DELAWARE RIVER SYSTEM 14
(1974).
55. See id. at 14-15. Fortunately for the early Dutch and English immi-
grants and their less fortunate African slaves, there was an abundant supply of
pure fresh water in the porous layer of soil laid down on Manhattan Island by
the Great Labrador Icecap. See id.
56. See id. at 15.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See WEIDNER, supra note 54, at 15.
60. See EDWARD WEGMANN, THE WATER SUPPLY OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
1658-1895 2 (1896). Called the "Kalch-Hook" by the Dutch, the English later
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/6
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fresh water, the Collect became known as a "very sink and
common sewer" where people threw their slop buckets and
some dumped their dead dogs and cats.6' The deteriorating
water quality obviously spurred the development of a "pure
and wholesome" water supply, but it was not the most
important.6 2
In 1793, Philadelphia was struck by a savage epidemic of
yellow fever which killed over 4000 of the city's population. 63
New York, Baltimore, and Norfolk were all struck in 1795
with heavy fatalities. 64 Many contemporary medical authori-
ties believed the abysmal water quality and the putrid condi-
tion of city streets were to blame for the epidemics. 65 The
almost omnipresent threat of fire was also a catalyst for up-
grading city water systems.66
The need for a public water system was recognized before
the Revolutionary War and became more pressing as New
refined it into the "Collect". See id. Extending from Pearl Street to Franklin
Street the Collect covered an area of forty-eight acres and was about fifty to
sixty feet deep. See WEIDNER, supra note 54, at 15.
61. See SIDNEY I. POMERANZ, NEW YORK: AN AMERICAN CITY 1783-1803: A
STUDY OF URBAN LIFE 278-79, 288-90 (1938).
62. See id. at 278-79.
63. See JOHN HARVEY POWELL, BRING OUT YOUR DEAD: THE GREAT PLAGUE
OF YELLOW FEVER IN PHILADELPHIA IN 1793 281 (1949).
64. See WILLIAM CURRIE, A SKETCH OF THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE YEL-
LOW FEVER, AND THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE BOARD OF HEALTH IN PHILADELPHIA,
IN THE YEAR 1799 55 (1800). New York and Philadelphia were struck again in
1798 with losses of over 2000 and 3500, respectively. See NELSON MANFRED
BLAKE, WATER FOR THE CITIES 6 (1956). And in 1799, yellow fever struck yet
again in Philadelphia, New York, and Charleston. See CURRIE, supra at 55.
65. See id. at 18. It should be pointed out that yellow fever is caused by the
bite of a particular female mosquito and is not waterborne. See POWELL, supra
note 63, at vii-viii. These facts, however, were not known at the time of the
outbreaks. The state of medical knowledge that then existed attributed yellow
fever, at least in part, to the substances contained in "noxious" water. See id. at
viii-ix. Thus, yellow fever served as a dramatic motivator.
66. For example, the fire of 1776 destroyed one quarter of all of the houses
in New York City. See BLAKE, supra note 64, at 5. Another fire in 1835, de-
stroyed 674 buildings and caused, according to some estimates, $40 million in
casualty. See WEIDNER, supra note 54, at 18. Thus, fire-fighting was also an
important motivation driving the clamor for sufficient water supplies.
1997] 587
11
588 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14
York's population continued to grow.67 In addition to the pop-
ulation pressures, the progress made by other eastern cities
prompted the business community to insist on action. The
New York Daily Advertiser, for example, warned its readers
in 1798: "Citizens of New York, what are you doing... If you
procrastinate, you are ruined; while you are immersed in
business or sunk in pleasure, careless of the future, other
towns, your rivals in trade, have vigorously begun the effec-
tual measures of precautions."68
Thus by 1799, the stage was set for the creation of the
legendary and notorious Manhattan Company. Although the
chartering of a private corporation to develop a water supply
system was opposed by then Mayor Richard A. Varick, his
objections were overcome through the united efforts of Aaron
Burr and Alexander Hamilton.69 Hamilton used his consider-
able influence to persuade the City Council that the munici-
pality should not build its own water works because it could
not raise sufficient capital through loans and taxes.70 Aaron
Burr, then a New York State Assemblyman, shrewdly rushed
the bill chartering the corporation through the state legisla-
ture in three days. 71
67. For example, in 1790 Manhattan's population stood at 33,131. See THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK CITY 923 (Kenneth T. Jackson ed. 1995). By 1800,
the population had nearly doubled to 60,515. See id.
68. CLAYPooLE's AMERICAN DAILY ADVERTISER, Dec. 20, 1798, at 2. The edi-
tors were responding to water works projects in Baltimore, Philadelphia, and
Bethlehem. See id.
69. See 2 MINUTEs OF THE COMMON COUNcIL OF NEW YORK 514-15 (1917);
James M. Betton, Extracts from a "Report Relative to Supplying the City of New
York with Pure and Wholesome Water, November, 1833, 18 J. NEW ENGLAND
WATER WORKS ASS'N 254, 255 (1904). What prompted this strange alliance is a
matter of conjecture. Compounding the mystery is the fact that Burr hoped to
break the Federalist stranglehold on banking by obtaining banking authoriza-
tion in the Manhattan Company's charter from the Legislature. See BLAKE,
supra note 64, at 52-53. Why Hamilton would participate in such an artifice
remains a mystery.
70. See BLAKE, supra note 64, at 49.
71. See id. at 50. Burr introduced the bill on March 27, had it read twice
the same day, from whence it went to a special committee composed of Burr and
two other members. See id. On March 30, the bill passed after superficial con-
sideration. See id.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/6
1997] WATERSHED AGREEMENT 589
Enacted on April 2, 1799, the Charter for the Manhattan
Company authorized the Company to condemn land for "pur-
poses germane to water acquisition and distribution."72 The
Charter stipulated that if the company failed to furnish "pure
and wholesome water sufficient for the use of all citizens"
within ten years of incorporation, the corporation would be
dissolved.73 As Edward Wegmann, author and water engi-
neer, stated in his work, The Water Supply of the City of New
York: 1658-1895, "[o]nly enough was done in introducing
water to maintain the Charter."74 By 1832, two years before
the beginning of the first Croton Reservoir construction pro-
ject, the Manhattan Company had laid only twenty-three
miles of pipe.75 This was the first of two phenomena that
were to plague New York's quest for water ever since: search-
ing for water outside its boundaries and an almost congenital
failure to meet its obligations concerning water.
72. Act of Apr. 2, 1799, ch. 84, § 2, 1799 N.Y. Laws 433 (Act providing for
the supply the City of New York with pure and wholesome water). It is inter-
esting to note that this provision allowed Aaron Burr to build the beginnings of
what is now known as the Chase-Manhattan Bank. See WEIDNER, supra note
54, at 21 (quoting MOSES KING, KING'S HANDBOOK OF NEW YORK 706 (1893);
Saul Hansell, Banking's New Giant: The Deal; Chase and Chemical Agree to
Merge in $10 Billion Deal Creating Largest U.S. Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29,
1995, at Al.
The Manhattan Company's financial businesses proved to be wildly suc-
cessful. In fact, in 1955, the Manhattan Company merged with the Chase Na-
tional Bank to form the Chase-Manhattan Bank. See Hansell, Banking's New
Giant, at Al. The historical irony is quite thick since the Watershed Agreement
requires New York City to obtain a letter of credit in order to secure some of its
financial commitments. See NEW YORK CITY WATERSHED, MEMORANDUM OF
AGREEMENT, FINAL DRAFT, Sept. 10, 1996, at para. 86 [hereinafter WATERSHED
AGREEMENT]. Chase-Manhattan is the issuing bank. Things have come full
circle.
73. Act of Apr. 2, 1799, ch. 84, § 7, 1799 N.Y. Laws 433.
74. WEGMANN, supra note 60, at 11.
75. See WEGMANN, supra note 60, at 12. Nevertheless, by June 11, 1800,
the New York Gazette and General Advertiser reported that six miles of pipe
had been laid and over 400 houses were receiving water. See I.N. PHELPS
STOKES, THE ICONOGRAPHY OF MANHATTAN ISLAND: 1498-1909 1378 (Arno Press
Inc. 1967) (1922). Thus, at the turn of the century, over 30,000 people still were
without access to clean safe water. Water quality was so poor that it was re-
ported at the time that Manhattan Company water contained "125 grains of
foreign matter in the gallon." Betton, supra note 69, at 258.
13
590 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14
With the population growing three and one half times in
thirty years to 202,589 in 1830,76 the Collect and other
ground sources became intolerably polluted and
overburdened. 77 Fire-fighting also continued to be a major
concern as 1828 saw another destructive fire that destroyed
hundreds of thousands of dollars of property. 78 By 1832, the
public demand for clean water had reached a fever pitch.
1. The First Croton Project
When asiatic cholera struck the East Coast in 1832, al-
most 3500 people were killed in New York City alone.79 Upon
examination, New Yorkers were impressed by the considera-
bly lower toll of 900 which the disease claimed in Philadel-
phia.80 Although incorrect in the conclusion, most observers
attributed Philadelphia's lower death-rate to its practice of
flushing the streets with water every day.8 '
In 1832, the New York City Council requested that the
state legislature enact a law directing the Governor to ap-
point five commissioners to study the problem and recom-
mend a solution.82 On May 2, 1834, a permanent Board of
Water Commissioners8 3 was authorized to raise the capital
necessary to finance the project and vested the Commission-
ers with the power to acquire water rights and land by con-
demnation. 84 This delegation of authority by the state
legislature to the City to regulate land use in the upstate wa-
76. See THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK CITY, supra note 67, at 923.
77. See id. at 1244.
78. See WEIDNER, supra note 54, at 18.
79. See JOHN SHARPE CHAMBERS, CONQUEST OF CHOLERA, AMERICA'S GREAT-
EST SCOURGE 17 (1938).
80. See id. at 76.
81. See id. at 63-77.
82. See id. at 35.
83. See WEGMANN, supra note 60, at 31.
84. Act of May 2, 1834, ch. 256, 1834 N.Y. Laws 451 (Act to provide for
supplying the City of New York with pure and wholesome water). In February
1835, the Board of Water Commissioners submitted a report to the City Coun-
cil. See WEIDNER, supra note 54, at 36. On April 16, 1835, based on this report,
the voters approved a plan to dam the Croton River and convey the captured
waters into Manhattan via an underground aqueduct. See WEGMANN, supra
note 60, at 35.
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tershed communities was the seminal act in a conflict that
has continued for over a century. Throughout the history of
the New York City Watershed, the power of condemnation,
which was first vested in the City for the construction of the
Croton System, would precipitate controversy, acrimony,
political battles and legal actions.85
From the first Croton project through the completion of
the Catskill and Delaware systems, the City has relied on the
power of condemnation for one obvious reason: local landown-
ers would not sell or vacate their land voluntarily at the
prices offered by the City.86 Although the City was, and is,
required by law to compensate the landowners, the prices
paid have not been considered adequate to justify the trauma
and heartache of having one's land, or entire town, absorbed
by the City's water supply systems.8 7 This is not meant to
suggest that landowners wanted more for their land; they did
not want to move even if they received fair market value.
The condemnation of land implicates far more than just
the economically quantifiable costs, or "just compensation,"
required by the letter of the law.88 More often than not, peo-
ple were resistant because of traditions and centuries old ties
to the land.
Opposition to the City's powers of condemnation coa-
lesced almost immediately. Westchester property owners
mobilized and petitioned the state legislature during its 1836
session to reduce the powers granted to the City.89 Although
unsuccessful, their action did lead the Legislature to pass an
Act on May 26, 1836 requiring that any land taken and not
used for the aqueduct or construction of necessary fences and
the like promptly be returned to the owner. 90 Considered in-
sufficient by the landowners, they continued to fight for addi-
85. See notes 72-191 and accompanying text.
86. See WEIDNER, supra note 54, at 35.
87. See id. at 38-39.
88. See U.S. CONST. art.V. The relevant clause reads: "nor shall private
property be taken for public use without just compensation." Id.
89. See BLAKE supra note 64, at 148.
90. See [Communication from the Water Commissioners to the Common
Council, Aug. 1, 1836], in 3 Documents of the Board of Aldermen 65-66 (1837).
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tional protections through legislation over the succeeding
decades.
The Westchester landowners again petitioned the legis-
lature in 1837 to restrict the powers of the City.9 ' The 1835
legislation was condemned as extending the boundaries of
New York City and "invading the historic manor of Cortlandt
and county of Westchester."92 The legislation was character-
ized as "repugnant to the Constitution of the United States
and the Constitution of New York."9 3 Foreshadowing future
Watershed disputes, it was asserted that the "good citizens
should be left, free from any such intrusion or disseizin,
peaceably to enjoy, retain, or dispose of their respective real
estates and property. . .94 As resistance to the acquisition of
land and construction of the aqueduct grew, surveying crews
were harassed, verbally assaulted, physically attacked, and
regularly denied access to property. 95
New York City also had to contend with land speculators
who bought farm land along the proposed aqueduct route, di-
vided the land into lots, and sought to convince the apprais-
ers that each of the lots was worth more than the entire
parcel had been before acquisition by the speculators. 96 Yet
despite the vociferous opposition, protests, and harassment,
the condemnation proceedings progressed at an accelerated
pace. By the end of 1838, the condemnations were concluded
for the entire aqueduct as well as the massive Croton Dam.97
The quick conclusion was to stand in stark contrast to later
condemnation programs and the reason was simple: New
91. See Blake, supra note 64, at 148.
92. Id. (quoting WESTCHESTER HERALD, Mar. 7, 1837).
93. Id.
94. BLAKE, supra note 64, at 148 (quoting WESTCHESTER HERALD, Mar. 14,
1837).
95. See id. (citing Stephen Allen, NEW YORK WATER WoRmS NARRATIVE, in
NEW YoRK HISTORICAL SociEry, Book 3).
96. See id. at 149. (citing [Communication from the Water Commissioners to
the Common Council, Jan. 9, 18371, in 3 Documents of the Board of Aldermen
100-01 (1837).
97. See id. at 150. See also WEIDNER, supra note 54, at 40.
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York City was willing to pay a premium for the land it
acquired.98
In 1837, construction of the Old Croton Dam commenced
on the Croton River about six miles from its confluence with
the Hudson River.99 The aqueduct to which it was connected
was 41.5 miles in length with a receiving reservoir at the ter-
minus at Murray Hill on Fifth Avenue at Forty-Second
Street, the site of the present day Public Library. 100 It was
1826 feet long by 836 feet wide and covered thirty-five acres
of land.'10 It had a capacity of approximately 180 million gal-
lons. 10 2 With great pomp and circumstance, the Croton Dam
and Aqueduct officially began supplying water to New York
City on the Fourth of July, 1842.103
When construction of the Croton Dam and Aqueduct be-
gan in 1837, the population of New York City was approxi-
mately 300,000.104 Per capita consumption stood at 26.4
gallons per day for a daily requirement of 7.9 million gallons
per day. 1o5 The Croton system was designed to accommodate
98. For example, Chief Engineer Jervis' predecessor, Major Douglass, had
estimated the value of the property necessary for the aqueduct at $39,600. See
BLAKE, supra note 64, at 150. New York City actually paid the landowners
$165,786. See id. Similarly, Major Douglass estimated the cost of the property
necessary for the Croton Reservoir at $28,500. See id. New York City paid
$91,412. See id. This "generosity" on the part of New York City was not to be
repeated.
99. See WEGMANN, supra note 60, at 37-38.
100. See id.
101. See WEIDNER, supra note 54, at 45.
102. See id. The first Croton Aqueduct was small by modem standards with
a cross section of fifty-three square feet, although it was almost three times the
size of Aqua Claudia, one of the more famous Roman Aqueducts. See LAzARus
WHITE, THE CATSKILL WATER SUPPLY oF NEW YORK CITY: HISTORY, LOCATION,
AND SUB-SURFACE INVESTIGATIONS AND CONSTRUCTIONS 6 (1913). The aqueduct
route follows the Croton River to the Hudson, continues along the Hudson to
Yonkers and then along the ridge between the Hudson and East Rivers. See id.
From there it crosses the Harlem River via the High Bridge, which was 1450
feet long between gatehouses and is composed of fifteen semi-circular arches.
See id. At the time, the High Bridge was considered quite a feat of engineering
and construction skill. See id.
103. See WEIDNER, supra note 54, at 48.
104. See THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YoRK Crry, supra note 67, at 923.
105. See WEIDNER, supra note 54, at 48.
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nine times the City's daily needs. 10 6 At that time, it was ex-
pected to service the needs of the City for generations to
come. 10 7 But to the surprise of all it was determined to be
inadequate almost as soon as it was constructed.
If one thing could be said to characterize New York's per-
petual battle for a water supply, it is that demand has always
outstripped supply.' 08 Within a few short years, the City ex-
perienced a dramatic increase in water consumption. The
City's population continued to grow at an astounding rate. 10 9
The proliferation of the water closet, or bathroom, together
with the flush toilet caused shocking increases in household
water use. 110 Finally, water waste was as prolific as it was
unpredictable."' In fact, it was the water waste which
prompted the City government to begin installation of water
meters to promote conservation. 112 The absence of water me-
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id at 56. Forty million gallons were consumed each day, four mil-
lion gallons in excess of the two thirty-six inch water mains that spanned the
Harlem River. See id. Thus, the reservoirs were drained dramatically in order
to meet the increased demand.
109. Manhattan's population, 312,710 in 1840, had grown to 515,547 by 1850
with a concomitant increase in the other boroughs. See THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
NEW YORK CITY, supra note 67, at 923. In fact, the original chief engineer of the
Board of Water Commissioners, John B. Jervis, had, in the late 1830s planned
the capacity of the Croton Aqueduct on the assumption that New York's popula-
tion would not exceed 800,000 before thirty years had passed. See John B,
Jervis, General Report on the Croton Aqueduct, Dec, 17, 1845, in 12 DOCUMENTS
OF THE BOARD OF ALDERMEN 456-57 (1845)). In fact, New York City's population
crossed the one million threshold in the late 1850s. See THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
NEW YORK CITY, supra note 67, at 923.
110. According to a study done by Sears & Roebuck, one toilet used about
115 to 120 gallons per day, or about 42,000 gallons per year in normal use. See
WEIDNER, supra note 54, at 55.
111. Two years after the Croton Aqueduct began to supply New York City,
the Water Commissioners observed that their plans had never contemplated
that fountains would be erected in public and private parks all over the city.
See BLAKE, supra note 64, at 168.
112. See WEIDNER, supra note 54, at 56-58. According to Edward Wegmann,
chief engineer of the Aqueduct Commission (1910), the Croton Aqueduct De-
partment began to supply meters as early as 1852. See WEGMANN, supra note
60, at 105-06. By introducing market forces into the equation, the installation
of water meters did have an effect on consumption. For example, according to
Commissioner Campbell of the Department of Public Works (1880),
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/6
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ters in many New York residences and businesses remains a
sore subject among Watershed residents.
At the height of flow from the Old Croton Aqueduct, the
system provided about ninety-five million gallons per day. 113
As the following table illustrates, water consumption contin-
ued to grow at astronomical rates as more and more people
flooded into New York City: 114







As consumption increased, new facilities were needed
and New York City built several new reservoirs in Westches-
ter County, and expanded northwards into Putnam and
Dutchess Counties. On April 3, 1865 (three days before Lee
surrendered at Appomattox) the state legislature passed an
act that authorized the City to build storage reservoirs in
Westchester, Putnam, and Dutchess Counties which set the
stage for a large expansion of the Croton System." 5 These
One large hotel which on the first application of a meter was found
to be consuming, or rather wasting, 115,000 gallons of water daily
was reduced to 45,000 gallons, and another from 80,000 to 24,000
gallons per day. In the first case resort was had to the aid of a well,
but in the second the saving was from stoppage of waste.
Id. at 106.
113. See BLAKE, supra note 64, at 277.
114. See WEG NN, supra note 60, at 107.
115. See WEIDNER, supra note 54, at 61. At the same time, the Legislature
passed an Act to "reorganize the Local Government of the City of New York,"
creating the Department of Public Works, which superseded the Croton
Aqueduct Department. See id. The Croton Aqueduct Department succeeded
the Board of Water Supply some years earlier. See BLAKE, supra note 64, at
161. The infamous Boss Tweed of Tammany Hall fame was the first head of the
Department of Public Works and used the position to enrich himself and his
cronies. See WEIDNER, supra note 54, at 62.
New York City responded by building the Boyd's Corner dam and reservoir
with a capacity, 2.7 billion gallons. See id. at 61. The next addition to the Cro-
ton system was located on the middle branch of the Croton River and was
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efforts were successful, but events during the late 19th and
early 20th centuries made it clear that even more would have
to be done. 116 Whence was born the New Croton Aqueduct
and Dam system.
2. The New Croton Aqueduct and Dam
By 1883, the demand for water had already outstripped
supply. Once again the legislature responded. Chapter 490
of 1883 authorized the construction of a new Croton Dam to
replace the original, which was then only forty years old. 1 7
The legislation placed authority for construction with a Board
of Aqueduct Commissioners."18 The Aqueduct was finished
on June 24, 1891 and handed over to the Department of Pub-
lic Works for operation."l9 Construction on the New Croton
Dam was completed in 1905 at a total cost of approximately
named, appropriately enough, the Middle Branch dam and reservoir. See Wil-
liam W. Brush, New York City Water Supply, 23 J. NEW ENGLAND WATER
WORKS ASS'N, 371, 374 (1909). Some years later, in 1891, the East Branch Res-
ervoir entered service. See NRDC REPORT, supra note 2, at 57. The same year,
in 1891, the Bog Brook Reservoir was built in Putnam County, near the town of
Southeast. See id. at 38. The Bog Brook was followed by the construction of the
Titicus and West Branch Reservoirs in 1893 and 1895, respectively. See Brush,
New York City Water Supply, at 374.
Two years later, in 1897, the Amawalk Reservoir in north central West-
chester County was completed. See NRDC REPORT, supra note 2, at 34. Over
the next fifteen years several more reservoirs were added to the Croton System.
The Muscoot Reservoir entered service in 1905; the Cross River Reservoir in
1908; and the Croton Falls Reservoir and Diverting Reservoir in 1911. See id.
at 45, 49, 53, 65.
116. 1880 and 1881 saw severe droughts during the summer months. See
WEGMANN, supra note 60, at 84-87. During July, August and September 1881,
less than five inches of rain fell. See id. at 86. Public fountains, drinking foun-
tains, and street cleaning hydrants were all shut during this period. See id. at
87.
117. Act of June 1, 1883, ch. 490, § 1, 1883 N.Y. Laws 666.
118. See id. § 1. The Department of Public Works (which formerly had au-
thority over construction of water supply infrastructure) was delegated the au-
thority to conduct surveying and drafting of plans. See id. § 2. This
Department was to submit its plans to the Aqueduct Commission for approval.
See id.
119. See WEIDNER, supra note 54, at 77.
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$15 million. 120 The new dam added nineteen billion gallons
of additional capacity to the Croton System. 121
However, as had happened when the first Croton Dam
was constructed, it was clear even before construction was
completed that the new Croton system would be inadequate
within a generation. 122 Again, the legislature responded. On
June 11, 1895, the legislature passed Chapter 985 of the Act
of 1895123 establishing the Ramapo Water Company and
vesting it with the authority to acquire land and water rights
in upstate watersheds. 124 The proposal was severely at-
tacked by many in and out of government. The prior efforts of
the Manhattan Water Company convinced many that this ap-
proach would fail and that, as the prior experience demon-
strated, supplying water to the public should be properly left
120. See Brush, New York City Water Supply, supra note 115, at 372. The
New Croton Aqueduct system was, for its time, one of the greatest engineering
feats in the world. More than three times as large as its predecessor, the New
Aqueduct could deliver 300 million gallons per day through its thirty-one mile
length. See BLAKE, supra note 64, at 277. At the time of its completion, New
York City's daily consumption stood at 183 million gallons per day and overall
water supply at 425 million gallons per day. See id. Thus, it seemed that New
York City's water problems had been solved for years to come. Once again, this
confidence was misplaced.
121. See NRDC, supra note 2, at 70.
122. See BLAKE, supra note 64, at 277-78. Others had begun thinking about
this issue several years before the completion of the New Croton system and
they pressed the Legislature to charter another water company similar to the
failed Manhattan Company of Aaron Burr fame. See id. 100-07. History about
the principal players in this effort is spotty but Nelson Manfred Blake described
it as an "outrage perpetrated through an unholy alliance of Boss Platt's Repub-
lican machine which controlled the Legislature and Boss Croker's Tammany
Democrats who ruled the city." Id. at 279.
123. Act of June 11, 1895, ch. 985, 1895 N.Y. Laws.
124. See WEIDNER, supra note 54, at 140 (citing MERCHANTS ASS'N OF NEW
YORK, AN INQUIRY INTO THE CONDITIONS RELATING TO THE WATER-SUPPLY OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK 598-99 (1900)). In addition to this incredible grant of
power to the Ramapo Water Company, the Legislature largely emasculated
New York city's own rights to obtain water. See BLAKE, supra note 64, at 278.
For example, the Greater New York Charter Act of 1897 prohibited New York
City from taking water from any watershed that was already serving as a
source of water for another municipality. See Act of May 4, 1897, ch. 378, § 472,
1897 N.Y. Laws vol. III, 1, 163.
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to those serving the public, namely the government. On
March 19, 1901, the legislature repealed the statute. 125
3. New York City Comes to the Catskills
The failure of the Ramapo Water Company prompted
New York City to renew its efforts to secure new water supply
sources. In 1901, the Commission on Additional Water Sup-
ply for the City of New York was formed to study the water
problem and propose possible solutions. 126 The Commission
proposed that the Esopus, Rondout and Schoharie Creeks be
dammed and incorporated into the New York City water de-
livery system. 27 The Commission's report set the stage for
New York's entrance into, some might say invasion of, the
Catskill region.
In 1901 and 1902, bills empowering New York City to
build a new water supply system were introduced in the state
legislature. 28 The staunch opposition of legislators from the
affected rural areas killed these measures. 129 However, by
1905, the demand for a solution increased and the legislature
passed a bill creating a new Board of Water Supply with
broad powers to plan and build a new dam and reservoir sys-
tem on the western side of the Hudson River. 130
125. See BLAKE, supra note 64, at 278-80; WEIDNER, supra note 54, at 147-48;
WILLIAM H. BURR ET AL., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON ADDITIONAL WATER
SUPPLY FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK 4 (1904).
126. See BLAKE, supra note 64, at 279. The Commission presented its find-
ings on November 30, 1903. See BURR ET AL., supra note 125, at 3. The thrust
of the Commission's study was that
Manhattan and the Bronx are already drawing from the Croton
supply an amount dangerously close to the limit of its yield in ordi-
nary years... If the City should experience either one year of low
rainfall, or, still worse, two such years in succession, as has oc-
curred a number of times in the near past, the capacity of the Cro-
ton basin would be exhausted unless consumption were restricted.
Id. at 5. In addition, Commission's estimated that water waste "from leaky and
defective plumbing fixtures probably exceed[ed] fifteen percent of the total sup-
ply, or upward of 40 million gallons per day." Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
127. See BURR ET AL., supra note 125, at 19-20.





On June 3, 1905, chapters 723131 and 724132 of the Acts
of 1905 were signed into law. 133 Structurally, chapter 723
created a five member State Water Supply Commission that
was vested with authority over the state's water resources
and gave the state veto power over any land acquisitions and
other related proposals.13 4
Chapter 724, known as the McClellan Act after its propo-
nent, Mayor George B. McClellan of New York, granted the
City the authority to tap the waters of the Catskill region,
subject only to approval of the State Water Commission. 135
In an obvious effort to secure support of legislators from
Westchester County, local municipalities would be permitted
to acquire water, at a cost not to exceed New York City's cost,
from any of the reservoirs and aqueducts located within the
county. 136 In recognition of the City's shabby treatment of
Westchester and Putnam County residents during the crea-
tion of the Croton System, chapter 724 guaranteed access to
the courts for determining a fair price for condemned land.137
While this may appear to be a rather insignificant protection,
it must be recalled that earlier statutes authorizing the con-
struction of the Old Croton Dam and the New Croton Dam
specifically referred adjudication of land values in condemna-
tion proceedings to three-person appraisal boards with no
provision for appeal to the courts. 138
Ironically, the 1905 Statutes did not accord Catskill resi-
dents the same protections since New York City could take
possession of a parcel of land, including the owner's dwelling,
just ten days after the appointment of an Appraisal Commis-
sion. 139 Condemnation in the Catskills began almost imme-
diately. The reaction was, of course, predictable. The
following year, 1906, responding to the outrage generated by
131. Act of June 3, 1905, ch. 723, 1905 N.Y. Laws 2022.
132. Act of June 3, 1905, ch. 724, 1905 N.Y. Laws 2027.
133. See WEIDNER, supra note 54, at 177.
134. See id. at 177-78.
135. See id. at 178.
136. See id. at 178-79.
137. See id. at 179.
138. See Act of May 2, 1834, ch. 256, 1834 N.Y. Laws 451.
139. Act of June 3, 1905, ch. 724, §§ 7, 11, 1905 N.Y. Laws 2031-32, 2033-34.
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the condemnation proceedings, the legislature passed an
amendment requiring New York City to pay one-half of the
assessed value of the land before taking possession. 140 In ad-
dition to the short period of notice, valuations of land were
quite low and led to some property owners and their families
being ousted from their homes for as little as $250.141
In June of 1905, Mayor George B. McClellan, pursuant to
authority granted in Chapter 724,142 appointed the original
Board of Water Supply.143 Two months after the appoint-
ment of the Board of Water Supply, surveying and boring
crews descended on the Esopus Creek area. 44 The City's
haste and seeming disregard for established procedures en-
gendered resentment in Ulster County. 45 The Catskill water
system was, according to Mayor McClellan, "certainly the
greatest engineering achievement of any kind, in the
140. Act of Apr. 24, 1905, ch. 314, 1906 N.Y. Laws 736 (amending section 11
of the Act of June 3, 1905, ch. 724, 1905 N.Y. Laws 2027).
141. See BOB STEUDING, THE LAST OF THE HANDMADE DAMs: THE STORY OF
THE ASHOKAN RESERVOIR 83 (1985).
142. Act of June 3, 1905, ch. 724, § 1, 1905 N.Y. Laws 2027.
143. See WEIDNER, supra note 54, at 180. The nominees were selected from
names proffered by the New York State Chamber of Commerce, The Manufac-
turers Association of Brooklyn, and the Board of Fire Underwriters. See id. J.
Waldo Smith, a highly regarded civil engineer and chief engineer of the
Aqueduct Commission, was named Chief Engineer. See STEUDING, supra note
141, at 24. Smith became the driving force behind the Board and served as
Chief Engineer through 1922 and then as a consultant until his death in 1933.
See id.
144. See STEUDING, supra note 141, at 26. Shortly after appointment, the
Board presented its plans to the State Water Commission, as required by law,
for approval. In May 1906, the State Water commission gave its approval to the
Board of Water Supply's plan for construction. See WEIDNER, supra note 54, at
185. The Board's plan, roughly speaking, envisioned a system consisting of the
Ashokan in Ulster County, Kensico in Westchester County, Hill View in Yon-
kers, and Silver Lake Reservoir in Staten Island and 126 miles of aqueduct.
See id. at 191. Essentially, the system would impound the water of Esopus
Creek in the Ashokan Reservoir, send Ashokan water through the aqueduct
and the Hudson River siphon to the Kensico Reservoir for storage, then to the
Hill View Reservoir in Yonkers, and from there into City Tunnel #1 and distri-
bution around the City. See NRDC REPORT, supra note 2, at 28, 82.
145. See STEUDING, supra note 141, at 26-32.
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world."1 46 As such, the Catskill project required immense
amounts of machinery and labor.147
The invasion and occupation of the Catskills was real.
Surveyors were found everywhere. More than 17,000 labor-
ers suddenly appeared in the area.148 Tent villages complete
with stores, churches, and taverns followed.' 49
Not surprisingly, the invading work force engendered
great resentment among the local residents. They blamed it,
probably correctly, for an increase in crime in the area.150 An
anti-immigrant sentiment developed. 15 1 Nevertheless, work
proceeded rapidly. By the end of December 1911, 78% of the
construction on the Ashokan Reservoir and the Catskill
Aqueduct was complete. 152
Earlier that year, excavation and lining of the siphon un-
derneath the Hudson River began. 153 Construction of the
Kensico Reservoir in Westchester County began the following
year in 1912.'5 At the same time, work on the Hill View Res-
146. BLAKE, supra note 64, at 280.
147. Just on the dam construction alone were nineteen steam shovels rated
at twenty to seventy tons, sixteen thirteen-ton steam rollers, twenty-five miles
of standard and narrow gauge railroad for the movement of earth and neces-
saries and a trestle bridge across Esopus Creek. See WEIDNER, supra note 54,
at 207. Rolling stock consisted of thirty-three steam locomotives and 579 rail-
cars. See id. By October, 1911, 1.5 million barrels of Alsen Portland cement
from Catskill, New York had been poured, and approximately 17,250 people
labored on the project and lived in camps maintained by the contractors. See id
at 212. See also, STEUDING, supra note 141, at 41, 50.
148. See WEIDNER, supra note 54, at 212.
149. See id. See also, STEUDING, supra note 141, at 41, 50.
150. See STEUDING, supra note 141, at 50-53.
151. See id.
152. See WEIDNER, supra note 54, at 212. As completed, the Ashokan Reser-
voir has a surface areas of 12.8 square miles (an area the size of Manhattan
below 110th Street), see id. at 191, a storage capacity of 127.9 billion gallons,
and a drainage area of 253 square miles. See NRDC REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
153. See WEIDNER, supra note 54, at 214-15. The Hudson River siphon, the
largest ever constructed, was a supreme engineering achievement. It is, for
most of its length, a fourteen-foot diameter concrete-lined tunnel that at its
greatest depth is 1,114 feet below sea level. It extends 5.5 miles from its de-
scent on the west side of the Hudson to its maximum point of ascent on the east
side of the Hudson. See id. at 215.
154. See id. Kensico, with a capacity of 30.6 billion gallons, was excavated to
create the western portion and is connected to Rye Lake in the east. See NRDC
REPORT, supra note 2, at 28.
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ervoir made rapid progress and by June, 1912 contractors
were laying the concrete bottom of the reservoir. 155 Finally,
on December 20, 1916, nine years and three months after the
first construction contract was awarded for the Ashokan dam,
the reservoir and aqueduct system was complete. 156
4. Ashokan Land Condemnations
"New York City just washed us away" said Mrs. Ferris
Davis of Kingston, New York and a former resident of the
submerged territory condemned to build the Ashokan Reser-
voir.'5 7 Anecdotal evidence suggests that more than 85% of
the male population in the Catskill region considered them-
selves farmers when the Ashokan Reservoir was built.158
With such a large proportion of the population engaged in ag-
riculture, the economic and emotional pain of the condemna-
tions was profound.
Indeed, the condemnation of land has costs far beyond
the mere compensation paid to the land owners.159 The emo-
tional bonds formed by inhabitants cannot be financially
quantified but nevertheless were quite real. It is facile to
suggest that the affected people could simply pick up and
move to another locale and resume their lives.16 0 According
to Elwyn Davis, a former resident of the village of West
Shokan (submerged by the Ashokan Reservoir), New York
City took the heart of the land and left the inhabitants the
rim. 161
155. See WEIDNER, supra note 54 at 216. Progress on City Tunnel #1 from
the Hill View Reservoir to the West Bronx, Manhattan and Brooklyn was also
substantial. Eight and a half miles had been excavated and concrete lining was
commenced. See id. Ultimately, City Tunnel #1 would be eighteen miles long.
See NRDC REPORT, supra note 2, at 82.
156. See STEUDING, supra note 141, at 105.
157. Id. at 100.
158. See id. at 101.
159. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
160. The commitment of the residents of the Catskills is evident from the
fact that 80% of the inhabitants who were displaced by the building of the Asho-
kan Reservoir remained within twenty-five miles of their former homes. See
STEUDING, supra note 141, at 100.
161. See id. at 101.
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As stated previously, Chapter 724 of the Acts of 1905162
enabled New York City to condemn land and take possession
quickly.163 The condemnation procedure was effected by pub-
lication of notice in two public newspapers for six weeks, peti-
tioning of the court in the relevant county to appoint an
Appraisal Commission, 6 4 and then, after an Appraisal Com-
mittee was sworn, giving the landowner ten days notice 65
and half the assessed value of the land before taking posses-
sion. 166 According to the New York City Department of Fi-
nance, New York City paid more than the market value of
property in every area of the Catskill Aqueduct. 167
As one might expect, appraisal hearings were extremely
contentious. 168 Section 42 of Chapter 724 of the Acts of 1905
provided for the compensation of consequential damages in-
flicted on land adversely affected by adjacent condemna-
tion.169 Yet, when average citizens presented evidence of
162. Act of June 3, 1905, ch. 724, 1905 N.Y. Laws 2027.
163. See id. § 11.
164. The Appraisal Commissions consisted of three commissioners. See id.
§ 1, 1905 N.Y. Laws 2027. The law provided that one commissioner reside in
the county where the condemned land was located, another reside in New York
county; and the third reside somewhere in New York State. See id. § 9, 1905
N.Y. Laws. Ultimately, eleven commissions were appointed. See WEIDNER,
supra note 54, at 234. Through 1912, they heard 954 claims encompassing
21,138 acres, 15,222 acres of which were located in Ashokan. See STEUDING,
supra note 141, at 86.
165. See Act of June 3, 1905, ch. 724, §§ 7, 8, 11, 1905 N.Y. Laws 2031-34.
166. See Act of Apr. 24, 1906, ch. 314, § 11, 1906 N.Y. Laws 738-39.
167. See HERMAN A. METz, LANDS TAKEN IN CONDEMNATION FOR THE NEW
CATSKILL WATER SUPPLY: THEIR COST AND THE ATTENDANT EXPENSES, attach.
(1909). For example, the Department of Finance states in a report on the con-
demnation proceedings that the fair market value of land condemned for the
Hill View Reservoir in Yonkers was $6,500 per acre. See id. The report goes on
to say that New York City actually paid an average of $11,541.18 per acre. See
id. Similarly, the fair market value of the land taken for the Ashokan Reservoir
was $60 per acre; the City allegedly averaged $153.46 per acre in payout. See
id. Taken at face value, these numbers suggest that New York City was overly
generous in compensating affected property owners.
168. New York City employed appraisal witnesses paying them $10 a day for
their services. See WEIDNER, supra note 54, at 240. Derisively referred to as
the "city's experts," they became discredited and "the subject of uncomplimen-
tary remarks." Id. From the perspective of property owners, the valuations
done by the commissions were insultingly low.
169. Act of June 3, 1905, ch. 724, 1905 N.Y. Laws.
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consequential or indirect damage, the New York City Corpo-
ration Counsel objected that the commission did not have ju-
risdiction to pass on such matters. 170 Furthermore, New
York City had the temerity to maintain that since the dam
had not yet been built and the reservoir had not been filled,
no decrease in the value of businesses or lands had oc-
curred.171 The City pointed to the new villages that had de-
veloped and the more than 400 new buildings constructed. 72
The contention that pervaded the hearings occasionally pro-
duced some absurd exchanges. While trying to determine the
value of property, the commissions heard testimony over
whether a "quiet sylvan brook" was worth more than a "mur-
muring brook." 73 And on one occasion over whether a house
was located "on the dirty side of street." 7 4 As a consequence
of the disrespect and caprice shown by many of the commis-
sions, relations between the City and local residents was, at
best, strained and, at worst, bitterly hostile.1 75
The conduct of the commissions was not the only reason
local residents had such contempt for the City. Corruption
and bureaucratic inefficiencies enraged local property owners
and fed the negative perception of the City. Speculation was
rampant during these years. 176 Landowners also resented
170. See WEIDNER supra note 54, at 237-38 (reprinting Letter from Justice
A.T. Clearwater to Assemblyman Joseph M. Fowler (Apr 9, 1908)). Appraisal
Commission Two, while not agreeing with Corporation Counsel's argument,
nevertheless ruled that evidence of indirect damages would not be received. See
id. at 231 (quoting Commissioner of Appraisal Proceedings). When Appraisal
Commission Five decided to admit evidence of indirect damages, Special Coun-
sel John J. Linson decried it as "absolutely monstrous." See id. at 232.
171. See id.
172. See BOARD OF WATER SUPPLY, EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF
WATER SUPPLY 21 (Jan. 1914).
173. See STEUDING, supra note 141, at 87.
174. See id.
175. Appraisal Commission Two's decision to exclude evidence of conse-
quential damages was made in 1908 in the case of Tina B. Lasher. See WEID-
NER, supra note 54. at 236, 249. Although this decision was ultimately reversed
by the Court of Appeals in 1910, it was cold comfort to Ms. Lasher who died in
penury during its pendency. See id.
176. According to the Pine Hill Sentinel, many landowners sold their land or
gave options on it to a "land option ring" identified with Tammany Hall. The
Catskill Water Scheme, PINE HILL SENTINEL. Dec. 12., 1908, at 2. Other news
reports stated that "shrewd real estate operators, with political affiliations have
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/6
1997] WATERSHED AGREEMENT 605
the fact that for every dollar that was paid in compensation,
the commissions spent more than fifty-four cents on adminis-
trative expenses. 177 Commissioners were paid $50 a day plus
expenses and appraisal witnesses paid between $10 and $50
per day.178 To see the perpetrators of their injustice enriched
while many were reduced to poverty, created deep and lasting
bitterness toward the City.179 It is unsurprising, therefore,
that bitterness and hostility were pervasive. The infirmity of
the 1905 laws coupled with the actions of the City and the
commissions created and perpetuated these feelings.
taken title to more than 1/3 of the land to be taken." STEUDING, supra note 141,
at 84.
177. See BOARD OF WATER SUPPLY, NINTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF
WATER SUPPLY 44 (Dec. 1914).
178. See WEIDNER, supra note 54, at 230, 247.
179. The ultimate insult occurred in mid-1913. In May 1913, the city con-
demned the church property of the Methodist Church in Glenford. See New
York City Sues Glenford Church, KINGSTON DAILY FREEMAN, May 19, 1913, at 1.
Subsequent to the $5,600 award received by the congregation, the property was
conveyed to the Ulster-Delaware Railroad as part of the line relocation agree-
ment entered into with New York City. See id. As a result of the change in
ownership, the congregation of the Methodist Church asked the president of the
railroad, S.D. Coykendall, if the Church could purchase the church edifice from
the company. See STEUDING, supra note 141, at 88-89. Coykendall replied that
the Church could take it no charge. See id. When news of this reached the
generous souls at the Corporation Counsel's office, they immediately and un-
abashedly demanded the return of the edifice on the grounds that half of the
edifice actually stood on city property. See id.
To add insult to injury, the Corporation Counsel sued for the full value of
the condemnation award instead of the rational remedy of the salvage value of
the church. See New York City Sues Glenford Church, supra note 179 at 1. It
also attempted to try the case in New York City despite the property, witnesses,
and defendants being located in Kingston and that the alleged tort of trespass
was committed in Ulster County. See STEUDING, supra note 141, at 88-89.
Sensibly, the court granted the defendants' motion for change of venue. See
New York City Sues Glenford Church, supra note 179, at 1. At trial, it was
adduced that while four-fifths of the church actually stood on City property,
City engineers who witnessed the removal had given their approval. See WEID-
NER, supra note 54, at 259-60. Appraisers called by the court estimated the
salvage value of the church at $75. See id. at 260. The jury ultimately found for
the City, but awarded only nominal damages. See id.
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5. The Delaware System: The Last Piece of the Puzzle
The completion of the Catskill system, however, did not
end New York City's perennial quest for more water. 180 The
continued need for more water prompted the Board of Water
Supply to plan and build the Schoharie Reservoir and
Shandaken Tunnel which entered service in 1926.181
Approval from the Board of Estimate and Apportionment
for development of the Delaware System came on January 12,
1928.182 Shortly after approval was granted, New Jersey
sued New York in the Supreme Court to prevent it from di-
verting water from the tributaries of the Delaware River;
Pennsylvania intervened to protect its own interests. 183
180. As Chief Engineer J. Waldo Smith reported in 1921:
During the 5-year period from 1916 to 1920, inclusive, the annual
rate of increase in the consumption of water has been 42 million
gallons per day. The Catskill supply was introduced early in 1917
and it is therefore evident if the increase in consumption should
continue at the rate of 42 million gallons per day per year, that the
entire supply of 600 million gallons per day will serve to meet the
increase in demand only until 1932, and that thereafter the water
supply situation will, in general, be the same as that which led up
to the development of the Catskill project in 1905.
See WEIDNER, supra note 54, at 284 (quoting BOARD OF WATER SUPPLY, FIF-
TEENTH ANNuAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF WATER SUPPLY 42 (1921)). J. Waldo
Smith's statement is typical of the history of New York City's water supply.
181. See NRDC REPORT, supra note 2, at 6. Water from the Schoharie Reser-
voir flows through the eighteen mile Shandaken tunnel into Esopus Creek and
then another eleven miles to the Ashokan Reservoir. See id. From the Asho-
kan, water is carried through the ninety-two mile Catskill Aqueduct into the
Kensico Reservoir. See id.
182. See WEIDNER, supra note 54, 291.
183. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 805 (1931). A Special Master was
appointed by the Court and hearings were held throughout 1930. See WEIDNER,
supra note 54, at 285. The Supreme Court handed down its decision on May 25,
1931 and it restricted New York's take of water from Delaware tributaries to
440 million gallons per day. New Jersey, 283 U.S. at 805. The decision also
provided for inspections by New Jersey and Pennsylvania in order to ensure
compliance, and the construction a sewage treatment plant at Port Jervis, New
York. See id.
The decree issued by the Supreme Court in 1931 was modified in 1954 to
reflect the agreement reached by the Special Master appointed pursuant to the
City of New York's amended petition, in which New York State joined. New
Jersey v. New York, 347 U.S. 995 (1954). The Amended decree allowed New
York City to divert 490 million gallons per day (mgd) after the Pepacton Reser-
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Construction on the Delaware system, delayed by the fi-
nancial woes of the Great Depression and the Second World
War, 184 was not substantially complete until the early
1950s.-8 5 Although the building of the Delaware System did
not generate the same level of attention as previous water
projects, it has the largest yield and storage in the entire New
York City water supply system.'8 6
The building of the Pepacton Dam and Reservoir demol-
ished the hamlets of Pepacton, Dunsraven, Shavertown,
Union Grove and Arena.18 7 Some residents sold their land
directly to New York City, thereby avoiding condemnation
proceedings. 88 Another aggravating aspect of the process
was the fact that some residents had to wait almost four
years to receive all of the monies due them. As noted earlier,
claimants received half the assessed value of their land when
New York City took possession and received the balance of
their claim when their case was settled by the Appraisal
Commission.'8 9 Again, the City pointlessly alienated the
voir was completed and up to 800 mgd after the completion of the Cannonsville
Reservoir. See 347 U.S. at 996-97.
184. See WEIDNER, supra note 54, at 287.
185. See NRDC REPORT, supra note 2 at 12, 16, 19, 23.
186. See FGEIS, supra note 5, at II-4.
187. See Dorothy Kubik, Water for New York City: The Pepacton Reservoir,
CATSKILL LIFE, Spring 1991, at 16, 20 [hereinafter Pepacton Reservoir].
188. See id. at 23. This approach, however, had its drawbacks. For example,
the Congregation of the Old School Baptist Church in Union Grove received
$4750 by settling directly with New York City. See id. By contrast, the Ap-
praisal Commission awarded $15,500 to the Congregation of the nearby Union
Grove Methodist Church. See id. According to the Catskill Mountain News,
"[tihe buildings appear to be of comparable quality outside." Id. The duality of
the City's land acquisition process, it seems, exacerbated the tensions between
itself and the Watershed residents.
189. See Act of Apr. 2, 1906, ch. 314, 1906, N.Y. Laws 738 (amending "[an
act to provide for an additional water supply of pure and wholesome water for
the City of New York"). However, in Shavertown, several property owners who
had their property taken in 1950 had to wait until May 1952 when the Ap-
praisal Commission heard their claim. See Pepacton Reservoir, supra note 187,
at 23. The awards were reduced, however, when the City appealed the claims.
See id. Fortunately, the property owners persevered until the Appellate Divi-
sion of New York State reinstated the original awards in 1954; almost four
years after the land was taken by New York City. See id.
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very people it would depend on to act as stewards of its drink-
ing water.
New York City's approach to interpersonal relations had
not changed much when the building of the Cannonsville
Reservoir began. 190 However, monetary compensation does
not tell the whole story. Once again, New York City's repre-
sentatives alienated the affected residents with their insensi-
tive and inflexible behavior.191
190. The Town of Cannonsville was submerged by the building of the Can-
nonsville Reservoir. See Dorothy Kubik, Water for New York City: The Cannon-
sville Reservoir, CATSKILL LIFE, Spring 1992, at 10, 20 [hereinafter
Cannonsville Reservoir]. All in all, ninety-four farms and five settlements were
inundated and 941 persons displaced by the rising water in 1966. See id. at 20.
According to Harold Peaslee of the nearby town of Walton, many residents
thought the prices paid by the City for condemned property were reasonable.
"Most people took what they were offered because they thought it was pretty
good." Id. at 10.
191. Pauline Goodrich, whose farm was taken as part of the buffer zone
around the Cannonsville Reservoir, described the notification process to Doro-
thy Kubik:
"This was put up 30 days after the date on the notice," she said,
indicating a large square cloth with fringed edges. Exposure to the
elements had turned it a streaked murky gray, but the black letter-
ing still stood out sharp and clear with the message that the prop-
erty to which it was attached had been condemned by the City of
New York. It was dated March 8, 1962. This notice, fastened to a
pole below the house, was the only legal notification the Goodrichs
received that their property would be taken by the city.
Id. at 17.
Mrs. Goodrich went on to recall that "four or five men would drive up...
and while the driver sat in the car, the others got out and told the owners they
had to go. They just said it's ours.' Id. at 18. "'My husband was a quiet mild
man, but when I came home from school one day and found him polishing his
gun, I really began to worry.- Id.
Helen Zandt, another resident who lived through the construction, had to
go to court to force New York City to give her family of farmers more than thirty
days to vacate their farm. See id. at 15. They ultimately moved out about one
year after being given notice. See id. Helen Zandt's brother lost all of his farm
and another seventy-six acres. See id. at 14. Her father lost only about fifty
acres, but according to Ms. Zandt, the City "took the land where the house was
and the flats." Id. at 15. "They took all the best land." Id. Ms. Zandt represents
some of the living memory that can't forget the upheaval caused by New York




The completion of the Cannonsville Reservoir in 1965 ef-
fectively finished construction of the New York City Water-
shed. From the first exertions in the Croton watershed in the
1830s, it took New York City another one-hundred and
twenty years to complete the system that it has today. It is
one of the greatest feats of civil engineering in American his-
tory and is one of the largest, if not the largest, unfiltered
water supply systems in the entire world. However, the com-
pletion of the reservoir system did not end New York City's
regulatory intrusion into the land use of the upstate water-
shed communities, nor the continued animosity engendered
thereby.
II. THE WATERSHED AGREEMENT AND
REGULATIONS
A. COUNTDOWN TO A CRISIS: REGULATORY
OVERVIEW
In the years following the completion of the three reser-
voir systems, the City all but retreated from the watershed
region. With the dams and aqueducts complete, City officials
returned home. Land acquisition efforts halted and few in-
spectors ventured north to survey the area. 192 Over time, the
City's policy became one of benign neglect. Although author-
ized to protect its drinking water, New York City did not at-
tempt to regulate land use in the Watershed until 1954.193
However, by the time the City chose to consider land use con-
trols, State law had been changed to require New York State
Department of Health (DOH) approval of its regulations. 194
Partly as a result of this check on the City's authority, and
partly as a result of a lack of communication, the best City
officials managed to get on the books was two and one half
pages of woefully inadequate provisions which were more ap-
propriate for addressing turn of the century health issues
192. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
193. See FGEIS, supra note 5.
194. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 1100.
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than mid to late twentieth century environmental
concerns. 195
The impact of these inadequate regulations was further
compounded by inadequate land holdings by the City around
the reservoirs and tributaries. By 1990, the City owned only
narrow strips of land around the reservoirs, leaving the rest
in private ownership. 196 At some locations, development had
encroached almost to the water's edge. 197 What little land
the City owned had come to be viewed as parkland by many
area residents. The results for water quality were disastrous
and nowhere were the results of the City's policy of neglect
evident than in the Croton Watershed.
Over the first hundred years of the life of the Croton Sys-
tem, surrounding land use slowly changed from large agra-
rian holdings to a mix of smaller farms and residential
housing on large tracts of land. Land around the aqueducts
healed and lush vegetation reappeared. Secondary forest
growth emerged from the old farm fields in the area. In
short, from the perspective of water quality impacts changed
little between 1842 and 1942. Thus, prior to the Second
World War, it mattered little whether the buffer areas were
privately or City owned. After the War, that would irreversi-
bly change with the devastating effects of the post-war hous-
ing boom.
During the post-war years, while the population in-
creased in each of the three systems, the greatest growth oc-
curred in the region surrounding the Croton. 19 To the horror
of regional planners and a budding environmental movement
growth mostly occurred without the benefit of any environ-
195. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 128.1.
196. See GORDON & KENNEDY, supra note 19, at 25. "The City owns about 7
percent of the land in the three watersheds, and about half of that lies beneath
the reservoirs." Id. at 25.
197. See id. at 25.
198. See GORDON & KENNEDY, supra note 19, at 5. For example, between
1970 to 1990, the population of the Croton watershed increased by 38.9% to
157,600 and the population in the Catskill/Delaware watersheds increased 13%
to approximately 47,000. See id.
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mental or regional planning.199 Privately owned buffer lands,
which had hitherto protected water quality, disappeared. 200
By the late 1980s, the City was left with a narrow strip of
land.20 1 Indeed, in some instances there was no buffer at
all. 20 2 Development had stressed the reservoirs with the ad-
dition of pollutants and the removal of forests and wetlands
that served as natural filters.20 3
Microbial contaminants and eutrophication from septic
systems discharges and sewage discharges from faulty treat-
ment plants, grease and oil from roads and parking lots and
biocides, fertilizers and pesticides from the lawns of homes,
corporate parks and golf courses posed and continue to pose
major threats to the reservoir water quality.20 4
Since 1953, enormous changes have taken place within
the boundaries of the Watershed:
199. Ironically, at the time Watershed negotiations began in 1995, many of
the local governments in the Catskill and Delaware systems either did not have
comprehensive land use plans or zoning ordinances or, if they did, they did not
require planning or zoning plans to consider avoidance of City water supply
degradation. As of June 1991, as much as twenty-one of the thirty-eight towns
in the Catskill and Delaware watersheds did not have zoning ordinances. See
GORDON & KENNEDY, supra note 19, at 5.
200. For example, in 1991, more than 10,000 new housing units were
planned for the already polluted Croton Watershed. See id.
201. See GORDON & KENNEDY, supra note 19, at 5.
202. See id. at 5.
In the Catskill and Delaware drainage basins, buffer lands usually
extend 300 to 500 feet from the reservoir shore, while in the Croton
watershed the buffer is often as thin as 50 to 150 feet... In addi-
tion, the City has exacerbated the problem by granting develop-
ment easements over its buffer lands.
Id. at 25.
203. See id. at 7.
204. See NRDC REPORT, supra note 2, at v. Among the most significant pol-
luters are 145 facilities holding DEC permits to discharge treated sewage and
other pollutants into watershed rivers and streams. See id. In addition, the
reservoirs and tributary streams are vulnerable to degradation and contamina-
tion from urban, suburban, rural, agricultural land use practices that result in
nonpoint source pollution and/or in adverse changes to the natural rate that
water flows into and through a specific drainage basin; improper use, handling,
storage, transport and disposal of a substance, including hazardous substances
and wastes, radioactive materials, pesticides, herbicides, fertilizers, winter
highway maintenance materials, solid wastes and animal wastes. See FGEIS,
supra note 5, at 111-1.
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substantial population increases have occurred, particu-
larly east of the Hudson River in Westchester and Putnam
Counties [principally the Croton System], traditional eco-
nomic activities have been supplanted by new ones, sec-
ond-home developments have grown up and evolved into
year-round communities; and every where the impact of
development on the natural environment has resulted in
adverse consequences never imagined in 1953. 2 05
The failure of the State and the City to effectively pre-
vent the degradation of the water quality over the past thirty
years is evidenced by the routine granting of permits by the
Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) for
homes, businesses, and hospitals to discharge sewage waste
directly into the water supply.20 6 In addition, there has been
a total failure by the state and City to prosecute polluters,
particularly where the source is the government.20 7 Further,
thousands of acres of wetlands which filter and remove pollu-
tants, store water for slow release into streams and aquifers,
provide habitat and help control floods have been filled or
paved over for development, particularly in the Croton Sys-
tem. Where vegetation once broke the flow of falling rain to
205. See FGEIS, supra note 5, at IV-1. Of particular concern to EPA are: the
potential contamination by GIARDIA LAMBLIA and viruses that results form ac-
tivities associated with residential and commercial development; the potential
for significant threats to water quality from other human activities, including
runoff from diary farming operations and discharges from wastewater treat-
ment plants (WWTPs) that are violating their State Pollutant Discharge Elimi-
nation System (SPDES) permits; and the recurring high turbidity in the
Catskill System that threatens long-term compliance with the raw water tur-
bidity requirements of the SWTR. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NEW
YORK CITY FILTRATION AVOIDANCE DETERMINATION 15 (April 1997) [hereinafter
FILTRATION AVOIDANCE DETERMINATION].
206. See GORDON & KENNEDY, supra note 19, at 3. By 1990, DEC had issued
approximately 130 permits to housing developments, schools, towns, prisons,
mental hospitals and industries to discharge treated sewage and waste water
directly into the streams and tributaries of the City water supply. Two-thirds
of these discharges were within the Croton Watershed. See id. at 10. None of
the permits set limits for pollutants discharged or required treatment to mini-
mize pollution. See id. at 11.
207. See id. at v. Thirty percent of the sewage treatment plants discharging
waste in the water supply in 1988 did so in violation of their permits, including




allow for absorption and filtration by natural processes, the
rain now sweeps across parking lots and roads, picking up
contaminants and "poison runoff - a toxic mix of road salts,
pesticides, gasoline, oil, pathogens, industrial chemicals, dis-
solved metals and sediments"-and depositing them into the
reservoirs.20 8
By 1990, as a result of "decades of careless development,
inadequate pollution controls and virtually non-existent en-
forcement of regulations," one third of the water supply was
borderline in quality.20 9 Thus, even before the most recent
Watershed crisis developed, the reduction and eventual elim-
ination of harmful discharges into the Watershed and the fu-
ture land use controls for the Catskill and Delaware
Watershed areas were identified as critical to the City for
long-term protection of the water supply. 210
By 1990, concerns for New York City's drinking water
were being raised in many quarters. It was clear that the
City would have to take some action. But surprisingly, as the
City began exploring its options, it encountered two obsta-
cles, public opinion in the Watershed Region and the often
arcane applicable laws and regulations. The roots of public
opposition have already been explored, but the obstacles
presented by New York law warrant some discussion.
208. See GORDON & KENNEDY, supra note 19, at 8-9. According to a 1988
EPA survey, poison runoff was the major cause of pollution in 30% of the stream
and river miles surveyed and 26% of the lake acres surveyed nationwide. See id.
at 9.
209. See id at iv. In 1992, due to the significant degradation in the quality of
the water quality within the Croton Watershed, the City entered into a stipula-
tion with DOH and EPA for the construction of a full scale water treatment
facility to filter Croton System water. See id.
210. See NRDC REPORT, supra note 2, at v. Indeed, the Kensico Reservoir,
the receiving basin for the Catskill and Delaware Systems which supplies 90%
of the water supply, is facing major pollution problems due to failing septic sys-
tems, bird droppings and runoff from Westchester County Airport in its heavily
populated, nine-square mile watershed. See id.
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1. Existing Watershed Regulations
In a rare preemption of local land use control,211 the New
York legislature passed a bill which became Chapter 723 of
the Laws of 1905212 (1905 Statutes) which preempted local
land use controls of the Watershed Region transferring it in-
stead to the City of New York. This extraordinarily broad
delegation of power was limited only by the requirement that
any plan to "acquire, take or condemn lands for new or addi-
tional sources of water"213 must have first secured the ap-
proval of the "State Water Supply Commission," a newly
constituted body established pursuant to a companion 1905
Statute.
The 1905 Statutes were extraordinary in New York not
just because of the state's long tradition of Home Rule, 214 but
because the City was given such extraordinary control over
land use outside of its own jurisdiction. The 1905 Statutes
survive to the present day as Section 15-1501 of the Environ-
mental Conservation Law which provides that no person or
public corporation may take or condemn lands for any new or
additional sources of water supply or for the utilization of
such supplies without a permit issued by the State Depart-
ment of Environmental Conservation. 215 The years following
enactment of the 1905 Statutes saw various attempts by up-
state legislators to chip away at the broad powers granted the
City in what became increasingly viewed as an unbalanced,
unfair, one-sided law.
211. Due to the inability of local regulation to protect regional interests, nu-
merous statutes have been adopted that preempt local control, including those
to protect estuaries, wetlands, drinking water reservoirs, wildernesses and riv-
ers, among other public objectives. In order to understand the ability of the
state legislatures to restrict local actions to achieve broader state objectives, it
is helpful to examine the history of home rule in New York and its constitu-
tional and statutory limitations. See John R. Nolon, The Erosion of Home Rule
Through The Emergence of State Interests In Land Use Control, 10 PACE ENVrL.
L. REv. 497 (1993).
212. Act of June 3, 1905, ch. 723, 1905 N.Y. Laws 2022.
213. Id. § 2, 1905 N.Y. Laws 2023.
214. See generally, Nolon, supra note 211.
215. N.Y. ENVrL. CONSERV. LAW § 15-1501 (McKinney 1997).
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For the purpose of understanding the latest Watershed
crisis, the most important of these legislative counterbalanc-
ing attempts was a new provision added to the Public Health
Law (PHL) in 1953.216 Article II, Title I, Section 1100 of the
PHL authorizes DOH to issue rules and regulations to protect
New York State and New York City drinking water.217 Sec-
tion 1100 further requires that DOH approve any rules devel-
oped by the New York City Department of Environmental
Protection (DEP) pursuant to the authority vested in that
agency by the 1905 Statutes.218 It was through this counter-
balancing process that the first Watershed regulations
emerged in 1954.219 And it was this process that probably
guaranteed that the regulations would have little impact
prompting one environmentalist to characterize the regula-
tions as "straight out of Mayberry RFD."220 While these reg-
ulations are by today's standards feeble, their existence alone
was source of great friction between the host communities
and the City over the forty year period following their pro-
mulgation.221 But they also evidence a subtle, interesting,
but altogether important shift that had occurred in the fifty
years since the 1905 statutes were enacted.
216. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 1100-05.
217. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 1100. The section states: "[tihe depart-
ment may make rules and regulations for the protection from contamination of
any or all public supplies of potable waters and water supplies of the state or
United States, institutions, parks, reservations or posts and their sources
within the state... " Id. § 1100(1).
218. See id. According to section 1100 of the Public Health Law, "[t]he com-
missioner of environmental protection of the city of New York and the board of
water supply of the city of New York may make such rules and regulations
subject to the approval of the DOH for the protection from contamination of any
or all public sources or potable waters and their sources within the state where
the same constitute a part of the source of the public water supply of said city."
Id.
219. See FGEIS supra note 5.
220. GORDON & KENNEDY, supra note 19, at iv. These regulations focused on
"manure piles outhouses and cemeteries, and ignored the threat of modern tox-
ins and the very transformation of the Watershed from forest or meadow to
suburb." Id. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit. 10, § 128.1.
221. For example, the fines for improperly disposing of human, animal, man-
ufacturing, and household waste were $10 for the first violation and $50 for
each additional violation. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit. 10, § 128.1(k).
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After 1953, the Environmental Conservation Law (ECL)
and the PHL had to be read together when assessing the
City's regulatory powers. For the first time since 1905, there
was a mechanism for Watershed communities to check the
unfettered power of New York City over the land use issues
in the watershed region. That subtle shift in power, while
unsatisfactory to both the City and Watershed communities,
was to have a profound impact on later attempts to protect
the Watershed, and even statewide politics, since DOH effec-
tively could stalemate any attempt to promulgate new Water-
shed Regulations.
Several other sections of the PHL, also enacted in 1953,
created a complicated legal balance between the City and up-
state interests. Section 1104, which has its roots in a 1909
statute, requires the City, at its own expense, to provide for
the removal or purification of sewage while also authorizing
it to condemn land necessary for such purposes.222 In addi-
tion, section 1105 provides for the payment of damages "occa-
sioned or sustained by such removal or enforcement,
including all injuries caused to the legitimate use or operation
of such property."223 Section 1105 also requires that an action
for damages must be brought in accordance with the eminent
domain procedure law.224
In sum, sections 1100 through 1105 of the PHL provide
New York City with the authority to protect its water supply
from contamination and degradation along with the obliga-
222. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 1104. In a recent Third Department
case, the court affirmed the DOH's ruling that Section 1104-1 "requires the City
to pay construction, maintenance, and operating costs for all sewage treatment
plants in the watershed, including privately owned plants that are public utili-
ties, where such costs are incurred to comply with [New York City Department
of Environmental Protection (DEP)] or DOH regulations which protect specifi-
cally the City's water supply and are not otherwise required by existing regula-
tions of other regulatory authorities." City of New York v. New York State
Dep't of Health, 164 Misc.2d 247, 251, 623 N.Y.S.2d 491, 194 (Sup. Ct., Albany
County 1995). In essence, the decision stands for the proposition that New
York City must pay for the implementation of regulations that protect its water
supply.
223. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 1105(1) (emphasis added).




tion to pay for it.225 Ironically, as a result of sections 1104
and 1105 the more the City chose to regulate, the more it in-
creased its exposure to damages. At the time these regula-
tions were promulgated, there was little engineering or
scientific information relating to the many potential threats
to unfiltered surface water drinking supplies.226
2. Changes in Federal Law
There has also been an enormous evolution in federal en-
vironmental law since 1953. In fact, EPA did not exist until
1973. Nowhere is this enormous evolution more evident than
in the body of law that regulates water quality, especially
drinking water.227 The most important of these changes is
the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) which was first promul-
gated in 1974. Pursuant to the SDWA, EPA promulgated na-
tionwide drinking water regulations specifying the maximum
level of harmful contaminants allowed in drinking water. Its
provisions also govern the construction, operation, and main-
tenance of the water supply systems.
In 1986, SDWA was amended requiring EPA to promul-
gate additional regulations specifying criteria under which
filtration would be required for surface water supply systems.
The Surface Water Treatment Rule (SWTR), promulgated in
1989, provides that avoiding filtration would require imple-
mentation by June 1993 of a comprehensive watershed man-
agement plan containing rigorous water quality standards. 2
28
Thus, without a Watershed Protection Plan containing at
least new regulations, the City would have no choice but to
225. The statutory revision of the 1905 statute in the PHL and the introduc-
tion of the state ECL regulations reduced the "unfettered" powers of New York
City over the Watershed. A water supply permit from DEC is now required
before the City can acquire additional land either by sale or condemnation to
protect the watershed. See N.Y. ENWrL. CONSERV. LAw. The permit must con-
tain conditions requiring a mitigation of the economic damage to Watershed
residents and communities resulting from any land acquisitions. See id. In ad-
dition, City Watershed regulations must be approved by DOH. See N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 1101.
226. See FGEIS, supra note 5, at 111-9.
227. See FGEIS supra note 5 at IV-6.
228. Violation of the terms of the SDWA, generally, or the SWTR, particu-
larly, can result in fines not to exceed $25,000 for each day of violation.
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filter the Catskill and Delaware Systems.229 It is important
to note that sandfilter beds, which are used in most standard
filtration plants, are not capable of removing two pathogens
that are of particular concern to New York City;
cryptosporidium and giardia lambia.230 Disinfection technol-
ogy, such as chlorination, can create by-products like
trihalomethanes which have deleterious effects on water
quality and is largely ineffective against cryptosporidium and
giardia lambia.23 1
Further, filtration does not address the health concerns
related to nitrate runoff from farming operations, as well as
the everyday "toxic chemicals from household cleaners,
paints, gasoline, pesticides and fertilizers which are dumped
down toilets or washed off the street and into the City water
supply" which can not be effectively screened by filtration. In
addition, the immense cost of filtering the Catskill/Delaware
System did nothing for the financial health of the City.232
Failure to meet the avoidance criteria was estimated to cost
the City between $6 and $8 billion in capital expenses to in-
stall a filtration system and between $200 and $400 million
in annual operation and maintenance costs. 233 On balance,
the public health and New York City seemed to be better
served if filtration could be avoided.
As of June 1993 upstate and downstate interests were on
a collision course. Upstaters who did not want new regula-
tions and more land acquisition supported filtration. City
residents wanted filtration at all costs and felt legally enti-
tled to enact new regulations as permitted by laws long on
the books.
In 1989, New York City began a review process of its reg-
ulations to further protect the water supply and to avoid the
filtration of the Catskill and Delaware Systems pursuant to a
229. It should be noted, however, that the efficacy of filtration is equivocal.
230. See GORDON & KENNEDY, supra note 19 at 30.
231. Sarah J. Meyland, Land Use & the Protection of Drinking Water Sup-
plies, 10 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 563, 577-578. Trihalomethanes are determined to
be carcinogenic.
232. See GORDON & KENNEDY, supra note 19 at 30-31.
233. See id at 3.
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stipulation entered into with EPA.234 The regulations pro-
posed by New York City in 1990 in its filtration avoidance
application to the EPA, included further regulation of land
use and watershed activities within the watershed which fur-
ther exacerbated the upstate/downstate conflict.
3. Roadmap to an Agreement
The legal exigencies created by the SWDA and the SWTR
compelled New York City to address the deteriorating water
quality in the Catskill and Delaware Systems. The require-
ments of the SWTR opened a new chapter in the conflict be-
tween New York City and the Watershed communities with
commencement of litigation by a coalition of upstate water-
shed towns challenging the City's filtration avoidance appli-
cation to EPA, the proposed regulations and the City's land
acquisition program. 235 This chapter, however, was compli-
cated by the participation of some of New York's largest and
most respected environmental advocacy organizations. So,
not only were the traditional combatants ready to battle, but
a third group was ready to attack either or both sides if the
Watershed protection proposals were not deemed protective
of the water quality.
In September 1990, New York City released a "discussion
draft" of proposed regulations to comply with the SWTR and
avoid filtration. 236 The proposed regulations, intended to re-
place the 1954 rules, provoked a firestorm of opposition and
litigation from the Watershed communities. Included in the
proposal were restrictions on agriculture, a ban on building
any new or expanded wastewater treatment plants, prohibi-
tions on new septic systems within 500 feet of any water-
course or 1000 feet of a reservoir and a ban on cemetery
expansion. In addition, in 1991, the DOH granted the City a
conditional waiver on the filtration requirement provided the
234. See FEIS supra note 5 at 11-14.
235. Preliminary Official Statement Dated April 21, 1997, New York City
Municipal Water Finance Authority, p.53.
236. FGEIS at E.S.-1 The proposed regulations were entitled Proposed Wa-
tershed Regulations for the Protection from Contamination, Degradation and
Pollution of the New York City Water Supply and Its Sources.
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City buy more buffer land, enact stricter watershed regula-
tions and hire more personnel to properly police the water-
shed and prosecute polluters.237 Obviously, these regulations
would have had dramatic economic and social impacts on up-
state communities, home to approximately 350 dairy
farms. 238 Watershed residents argued that the prohibitions
on infrastructure construction confined the Watershed Re-
gion to a future devoid of economic or community growth. In
fact, one resident group concluded that the prohibition re-
garding construction near watercourses left the communities
with no land on which any development could occur.
The proposed regulations also greatly exceeded local zon-
ing provisions and state wetlands restrictions prompting con-
cerns that inhabited areas along watershed streams and
rivers would no longer be able to expand, greatly reducing the
density of rural land development. 239 Essentially, Watershed
residents characterized the proposal as a depopulation
scheme. These conflicting interests - erosion of local control,
arrested economic development and water supply degrada-
tion - "pitted the self-interest of the state's largest city
against those of a host of awakening rural towns and
villages."240
And as if the regulations themselves were not enough to
set the parties at odds, New York City's rhetoric virtually
guaranteed an atmosphere of acrimony and bitterness.241
For example, in August 1990, Al Appleton, then head of the
DEP, tactlessly asked the rhetorical question: "Do we make
nine million people pay billions to clean up after those who
237. Watershed Update at 1.
238. N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1993, Section B. p. 1, Col. 5
239. Diana Shaman, Upstate Developers Irked at City's Plans, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 20, 1991, at A24.
240. 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 497 at 537.
241. This is not to say that heated rhetoric was the exclusive preserve of
New York City. Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., environmental attorney for the Hudson
Riverkeeper and the Natural Resources Defense Council, rhetorically asked in
a media campaign, "How much of Amy Fisher's urine was seeping into City
reservoirs from the Bedford Correctional Facility?" Ken Market, director of the
Coaction of Watershed Towns, remarked "They (NYC) have for the longest time
been a conquering force in this area..."
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would turn the pristine waterways and beautiful mountain-
sides of our Catskills watersheds into a chop-chop environ-
mental ticky-tack?"
Mr. Appleton's labeling the watershed "our Catskills"
touched an exposed raw nerve in the region. As was previ-
ously noted, the roots of the Watershed communities date
back to before the founding of the Republic. Two years later,
Commissioner Appleton further exacerbated the situation
when he was quoted as saying: "What the [proposed] water-
shed regulations represent is this: It's over, folks. You got to
pay the real costs now."242 This needlessly inflammatory
rhetoric precipitated an immediate counterattack.
Watershed residents wasted no time preparing them-
selves for another "Conflict in the Catskills." First, they
formed a Coalition of Watershed Towns(CWT)-comprising
thirty-three towns and five county governments-to fight the
proposed regulations. 243 Then to ensure that the CWT had
adequate resources to fight the City's proposal, State Senator
Charles Cook, who represented a portion of the Watershed
region, secured a $100,000 appropriation in the State Budget
to aid the coalition. The appropriation would continue for the
next five years. Thus, we had the amazing circumstance of
state tax dollars being used to defeat a proposal advanced by
the City to protect the drinking water of two-thirds of the
state's residents. The Coalition used much of the appropria-
tion to pay legal fees incurred after commencing legal action
challenging the proposed Watershed Protection Plan.
As a result of the litigation, DOH withdrew the waiver.
In January 1993, EPA issued a one-year Filtration Avoidance
Determination (FAD) requiring the City to finalize a Water-
shed Protection Plan by September 31 of that year which in-
cluded: new watershed regulations and a minimum of $44
million commitment for land acquisition. Later that year, af-
ter negotiations broke down, the EPA appointed a panel of
experts to review existing data, and advise whether the con-
ditions of the FAD could be met, and what, if anything, DEP
242. Audubon, National Audubon Society, Vol. 94, No. 1, p. 94.
243. See Watershed Update at 1.
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and DOH could do to improve water quality conditions.
Amazingly, the panel reported that filtration could and
should not be avoided, and recommended that EPA order the
City to begin filtering its water supply immediately. The
prospects for filtration avoidance looked grim. Indeed, the
prospects for New York City, already faced with a multi-bil-
lion dollar budget deficit, looked even worse. Commissioner
Appleton, added the "coup de gras" describing Watershed
Protection as "manure management" in a New York Times
article. There appeared to be no possibility of reaching a
consensus.
In August 1993, the City took a significant step toward
filtration avoidance when it submitted a water supply permit
application to DEC for the acquisition of 10,000 acres. In
September 1993, under the Dinkins Administration, the City
submitted to EPA a Long-Term Watershed Protection and
Filtration Avoidance Program for the Catskill/Delaware Sys-
tem. The proposal, which included revised "draft regula-
tions" and a $759 million water control program, was viewed
quite rightly by most impartial observers as a cost shifting
sham.2
4 4
Thus, the relations between the two sides were less than
amicable when Governor Pataki took office in 1994. Litiga-
tion was pending. The parties were barely speaking. EPA
244. The program which included a land acquisition program ($201 million),
an increase in City staffing ($200 million); the remediation of Kensico Reservoir
($7 million); the proposed upgrade of City-Owned WWTPs ($121 million); an In-
City sampling program ($8 million); a cover for the Hillview Reservoir ($100
million); a Zebra Mussel program ($19 million); and cost sharing measures
($103 million); Agricultural programs ($35 million); WWTP upgrades and septic
($65 million); individual sewer/WWTP projects for which the City was already
obligated ($2 million). In October 1993, legislative hearings on the City's water
supply permit application were held in Watershed communities located both
east and west of the Hudson River. Although the meetings held east of the
Hudson were subdued, the first meeting held in the west of the Hudson Water-
shed communities was attended by nearly 800 people at the Tri-Valley Central
School Auditorium in Grahamsville. The people in attendance were angry
about the City not consulting with the communities before the water supply
permit application was filed with DEC, and the City continued to be unclear
about its intentions regarding the land acquisition program, particularly its po-




maintained that filtration would be necessary absent an
agreement. New York City's financial ability to build an op-
erate the filtration plant was dubious. Something had to be
done.
It was not now a matter of good environmental policy
that New York replace outdated regulations and acquire land
to protect the water from over development. The City had the
Hobson's Choice of building a multi-billion filtration plant or
instituting a Watershed Protection Plan that was acceptable
to EPA, affordable to New York City and protective enough of
Watershed interests to satisfy the ECL and PHL.
Throughout most of the 1990s this appeared an impossi-
ble task. Devising a solution could only be accomplished in a
manner that respected the New York State home rule tradi-
tion of local control. 245 Thus, the stage was set when the EPA
and other interested parties urged the Governor of New York
to intercede.246 The Governor agreed to bring the parties, in-
cluding the state, the City, Watershed communities, and var-
ious environmental organizations together in a consensus-
building approach to negotiate a reasonable, effective and sci-
entifically-defensible watershed protection program. 247
As we surveyed the landscape, we quickly realized sev-
eral things had to be done. First, the Governor's office must
act as a neutral convener.248 Thus, the counsel to the Gover-
nor's office convened an issues meeting with all the govern-
mental parties. Included in the meeting were the City of New
York, EPA, West of Hudson communities represented by the
245. The concept of home rule is quite simple. Embodied in Article IX of the
New York State Constitution, "home rule" is intended to preserve local control
for cities, towns, and villages and to preserve the powers of self-government The
New York State Constitution of 1777 recognized local self-government and pro-
vided that the principle could not "be departed from without changing the Con-
stitution itself." Indeed, the opening paragraph of Article IX enunciates the
philosophy underlying home rule, "Effective local self-government and inter-
governmental cooperation are purposes of the people of this state."
246. See FILTRATION AVOIDANCE DETERMINATION, supra note 205, at 20-21.
247. See id at 21.
248. As John Gardener in "On Leadership" said, "the convener must be per-
ceived by potential members of the coalition as neutral and trustworthy, but
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Coalition of Watershed Towns, Putnam and Westchester
Counties.
4. The Birth of the Watershed Agreement
At the outset of the negotiations, all day meetings were
held at least twice a week. As the negotiations progressed,
the parties met more frequently, until it was not uncommon
to meet every day. At the outset, the Counsel's office realized
that creating an atmosphere of trust and consensus building
was imperative. Given the strained nature of the relation-
ship, this was the sine qua non of the negotiations. Accord-
ingly, the Counsel's Office laid down several ground rules for
the process.
First, there was to be no negotiating in the press. The
parties agreed not to answer substantive questions from re-
porters, but were free to talk about the process. Second, the
parties were told to prioritize their issues. Prioritization
made it possible to achieve consensus because it structured
meetings in a way that addressed bridgeable differences at
the beginning and end of meetings, thereby avoiding parties
walking away with a bad taste in their mouth. Third, meet-
ings were conducted at neutral locations, the locations were
moved frequently, and casual dress was urged in order to re-
duce the formality. Fourth, the parties agreed that issues
discussed and agreements reached could not be used against
a party in later negotiations. By insisting on adherence to
these simple rules, tension was reduced, the beginnings of
trust were established, and substance began to triumph over
rhetoric.
After establishing the ground rules, the participants
were organized into "principals groups" that dealt with the
most important issues at meetings with the highest levels of
the parties. After the governmental parties felt comfortable
with the course of the negotiations, representatives of the en-
vironmental community were brought into the negotiations
and members of the business community were consulted. Fi-
nally, the participants and the administration realized that
consensus was necessary in order to obtain the support of the
constituents of the parties. Thus, it was understood and ac-
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cepted that the agreement would be a compromise, and would
not be perfect from any one party's perspective.
Flexibility was also engineered in the process to deal
with issues that were not capable of being resolved in a
timely fashion. For instance, in situations where the scien-
tific evidence is equivocal, the Watershed Agreement (Water-
shed Agreement or Agreement) plans to generate the science,
make a decision, and if needed to modify the Watershed Reg-
ulations. Also, the Agreement establishes a number of mech-
anisms to continually track the progress of the parties in
implementing and meeting the goals of the Agreement. For
example, adjustments in the programs created by the Agree-
ment will be considered in order to adjust to changing circum-
stances. And, an oversight body, the Watershed Partnership
and Protection Council, was established with representation
from nearly every constituent group interested in, or relying
on, the water supply. This is just one illustration of the par-
ties' commitment to regulating the Watershed in the most
prudent and least burdensome manner.
B. WATERSHED AGREEMENT
The New York City Watershed Agreement reached
among the Watershed communities, certain environmental
organizations, New York City, New York State and the EPA
identifies the elements of the City's Watershed protection
program that will protect the City's drinking water supply
and the economic vitality of the upstate Watershed communi-
ties. The Agreement reflects a new partnership among the
parties to implement a variety of watershed protection pro-
grams in the midst of economic and environmental circum-
stances that have no analog anywhere in the United States.
The Watershed Agreement recognizes that the preservation
of the City's water supply must be achieved through vigorous
water quality protection and the preservation of the vitality
of the upstate Watershed communities.
Included in the Watershed Agreement are programs to
protect water quality and foster partnership between the City
and the upstate Watershed communities. The Agreement
1997] 625
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consists of several different Watershed protection programs,
including Land Acquisition, 249 Watershed Regulations, 250
Watershed Protection and Partnership Programs, 251 and the
Watershed Protection and Partnership Council. 252
1. Land Acquisition Program
The Land Acquisition Program will enable the City to ac-
quire, through the purchase of fee title to, or conservation
easements on, environmentally sensitive, undeveloped land
from willing sellers.253 This represents a seismic shift in wa-
tershed relations that gives form to the City's recognition of
the resentment generated by the use of eminent domain. In
addition, the City will pay fair market value for property,254
continue to pay property taxes,255 and will participate in a
community review process for property the City intends to
purchase. 256
The Agreement provides for a ten year water supply per-
mit for land acquisition to be issued by the Department of
Environmental Conservation (DEC), with environmental
groups and the Coalition of Watershed Towns agreeing not to
oppose the issuance of the permit.257 In turn, New York City
will spend $260 million ($250 million in the Catskill & Dela-
ware Watershed and $10 million in the Croton Watershed) to
acquire property important to the protection of drinking
water quality.258 New York State has pledged $7.5 million
for land acquisition in the Croton watershed. 259
249. See infra notes 253-61 and accompanying text.
250. See infra notes 262-65 and accompanying text.
251. See infra notes 307-17 and accompanying text.
252. See infra notes 326-32 and accompanying text.
253. See id. paras. 59-61.
254. See id. para. 61.
255. See id. para. 76. It is a historical irony that the meeting at which New
York City agreed to relinquish its eminent domain authority occurred in King-
ston, New York, which was the site of the most bitterly contested condemnation
hearings of the Ashokan Reservoir construction. See STEUDING, supra note 141,
at 32.
256. See WATERSHED AGREEMENT, infra note 270, para. 60.
257. See id. para. 58.
258. See WATERSHED AGREEMENT, infra note 270, para. 74.
259. See id. para. 76.
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An innovative aspect of the Agreement allows towns and
villages in the Watershed an opportunity to exempt certain
areas from solicitation under the Land Acquisition Pro-
gram260 and prevents the City from acquiring inhabited
lands.261 These provisions recognize the need to balance the
protection of environmentally sensitive areas and the protec-
tion of reasonable economic opportunities.
2. Watershed Regulations
The new Watershed Regulations, which replace the two
and a half pages of 1953 regulations, have been carefully
crafted to ensure the continued, long-term protection of the
City water supply and minimize, to the extent feasible, the
adverse impacts on the Watershed communities. The 1953
regulations were written prior to the recent appreciation in
the engineering and scientific community of the wide range of
threats facing surface water supplies.262 Moreover, the 1953
regulations do not reflect the recent federal and state legisla-
tion regarding drinking water standards, water pollution,
and hazardous and solid waste.263
A major breakthrough negotiated in the Watershed
Agreement is the City's commitment to pay for infrastructure
upgrades or management practices that are required to com-
ply with City, as opposed to state or federal, watershed pro-
tection regulations. 264 By putting its money where its
drinking water is, New York City is ensuring that the costs of
safe drinking water are borne by the people who use it; New
York City residents. The City has also committed to help
fund upgrades required by the State Pollution Discharge
Elimination System permits.265
260. See id. paras. 68, 70.
261. See id. paras. 67, 69.
262. See FGEIS at 111-9.
263. See id.
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3. Wastewater Treatment Plants
Under the new Regulations, all existing wastewater
treatment plants (WWTPs) must install sophisticated tech-
nology to perform micro-filtration and phosphorous removal
within five years of the signing of the Agreement. 266 "The
City agrees to pay for the costs of designing, permitting, con-
structing and installing all regulatory upgrades called for by
the Regulations."26 7 In order to help Watershed communities
avoid reallocation of scarce municipal resources away from
needed public services, New York City will also provide $5
million in funding to help existing plants comply with New
York State regulations.26 8
Recognizing the deleterious effects on water quality of
phosphorous discharges 26 9 associated with the operation of
WWTPs and the health implications of coliform bacteria, the
Regulations prohibit the construction of new surface dis-
charging WWTPs in phosphorous and coliform restricted ba-
sins and areas within the sixty day travel time to the City's
distribution system.270
The Regulations, however, are not applied in a dogmatic
or mechanistic fashion. The Watershed Agreement and Reg-
ulations provide for pilot programs in east and west of the
Hudson River areas in order to study the feasibility of ex-
panded WWTPs within water quality sensitive areas.271
East of the Hudson River, the Regulations provide for up
to three surface discharging WWTPs in phosphorous re-
stricted basins to be built in Putnam County. 272 Similarly,
266. See id. para. 141.
267. See id.
268. See id. para. 121.
269. See ROBBINS ET AL., supra note 10, at 10. Discharge of poorly treated
wastewater with high concentrations of nitrogen and phosphorous contributes
to accelerated rates of algal activity and eutrophication. See id.
270. See WATERSHED AGREEMENT, Attachment W, Proposed Watershed
Rules and Regulations § 18-36(b), (c), (d)(1) [hereinafter WATERSHED REGULA-
TIONS]. Sixty day travel time refers to the period necessary for water to enter a
reservoir and then reach the City's distribution system. See id. Sixty days are
required for the natural extinction of the most common pathogens. See id.
271. See id. §§ 18-82, 18-83.
272. See id. § 18-82(g).
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the Regulations provide for the construction of up to three pi-
lot WWTPs west of the Hudson River.273
Assuming the pilot programs demonstrate the efficacy of
phosphorous offsets, the Regulations permit the construction
or expansion of WWTPs. 274 Section 18-82 allows construction
or expansion of WWTPs within phosphorous restricted basins
or the sixty day travel time in the Croton system if certain
conditions are met. First, site constraints must prevent the
proposed new WWTP or the expansion of an existing plant
from discharging subsurface. 275 Second, DEC must deter-
mine that the new or expanded WWTPs will not discharge
more than 10% of the total volume of plants whose discharge
has been diverted outside the Croton watershed. 276 Alterna-
tively, DEC must determine that for every one kilogram of
increased phosphorous discharge there is a three kilogram re-
duction of phosphorous loading within the basin where the
plant is located. 277
4. State Assistance for New Wastewater Treatment
Plants Constructed Under Pilot Program
Six hundred thousand is available from the State to par-
ticipants in the Phosphorus Off-set Pilot Program established
by the Watershed Regulations to be used to (1) design and
construct equipment or facilities necessary to achieve the
phosphorus off-sets required by the Pilot Program, (2) moni-
tor the effectiveness of the measures in achieving the phos-
phorus off-sets, and (3) evaluate the effectiveness of the Pilot
Program in protecting water quality.278
5. Septic Systems
The Watershed Agreement provides, at the option of
Putnam, Westchester, Schoharie, and Ulster Counties, for
delegation of approval authority for septic systems to the re-
273. See id. § 18-83(a).
274. See id. § 18-82(e)(ii).
275. See WATERSHED REGULATIONS, supra note 270, § 18-82(e)(1).
276. See id. § 18-82(e)(4)(i).
277. See id. § 18-82(e)(4)(ii).
278. See WATERSHED AGREEMENT, supra note 270, para. 152. XX
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spective county health departments.279 In addition, the Reg-
ulations provide for expeditious review of septic placements
in cases where the City's approval is needed.280 Further-
more, the City will reimburse the counties for their costs in
administering the delegated program beyond the activities
required by County and DOH regulations and standards.28 '
Recognizing the impact septic systems can have on water
quality, the Regulations prohibit new conventional septic sys-
tems within 100 feet of a watercourse or wetland or 300 feet
of a reservoir. 28 2 The Regulations also ban new raised septic
systems within 250 feet of a watercourse or 500 feet of a res-
ervoir. 28 3 As in the case of phosphorous control, if it is deter-
mined that septics can be safely placed within the 100 foot
buffer zone, the Regulations will be amended to reflect that
reality.28 4
The issue of how large a buffer zone must be to provide
adequate protection to drinking water is subject to some dis-
pute since the science is relatively inconclusive. As a result,
the Agreement calls for a septic siting study in order to de-
velop the science necessary for a truly informed judgment re-
garding the size of effective buffer zones. 285 Making sure that
the judgments in the Agreement were based on hard science
in order to minimize the adverse economic impact was crucial
to the success of the endeavor.
6. Septic System Rehabilitations and Replacements
The City is providing $13.6 million for a program to (1)
pump-out and inspect such systems to determine whether re-
habilitation or replacement is appropriate, (2) rehabilitate
such systems that are failing, and (3) replace or upgrade ex-
279. See id. para. 93.
280. See id. para. 93(b).
281. See id. para. 93.
282. See WATERSHED REGULATIONS, supra note 270, § 18-38(a)(5).
283. See id. § 18-38(a)(6)(i). In the event lot size prevents compliance with
the septic system buffer zone requirements, section 18-38(a)(6)(ii) allows place-
ment 100 feet from any watercourse or wetland and 300 feet from any reservoir
or controlled lake.




isting substandard underground sewage treatment sys-
tems.286  The Catskill Watershed Corporation (CW
Corporation) will act as program manager of this Partnership
Program and will select and prioritize areas, allocate specific
funding amount based on the prioritization, and disburse pro-
gram funds. 287
The CW Corporation, an independently locally based and
administered not-for-profit corporation, will be created to es-
tablish a working partnership between the City and Water-
shed communities that lie west of the Hudson River.288 The
CW Corporation is to be involved in a variety of partnership
programs included in the Watershed Agreement.
7. Stormwater Controls
Stormwater runoff from farms and impervious surfaces
such as roads and parking lots are a significant source of
water contamination. 28 9 Section 18-39 prohibits new imper-
vious surfaces within 100 feet of a watercourse or wetland,
and within 300 feet of a reservoir. 290 New roads within fifty
feet of an intermittent stream or wetland, 100 feet of a peren-
nial stream or 300 feet of a reservoir. 291
However, paving of an existing dirt or gravel road is per-
mitted if there is a satisfactory stormwater pollution preven-
tion plan.292 Also, access roads to subdivisions will be
allowed within the 100 foot buffer distance subject to ap-
proval of the City of a stormwater pollution prevention
plan.293
Impervious surfaces are also prohibited within 100 feet
of a watercourse or wetland, except for certain activities if lo-
cated in a village, hamlet or area zoned commercial/indus-
trial in west of the Hudson River or a "designated Main
286. See id. para. 124.
287. See id.
288. See id. paras. 117, 118, 120.
289. See ROBBINS ET AL., supra note 10, at 11-12, 14.
290. See WATERSHED REGULATIONS, supra note 270, § 18-39(a)(1).
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Street Area" east of the Hudson River and the project sponsor
receives approval of the stormwater pollution prevention plan
from the City.294
8. Stormwater Pollution Prevention Plans
The Regulations provide New York City with review and
approval authority for stormwater pollution prevention plans
submitted for certain types of projects. 295 The following
projects are subject to City approval: (1) activities that result
in the disturbance of five acres or more; (2) the construction of
new subdivisions; (3) land clearing involving two or more
acres, located at least in part within 100 feet of a watercourse
or wetland or 300 feet of a reservoir; (4) the construction of an
impervious surface of 40,000 square feet or more; (5) the con-
struction of solid waste management facilities within 300 feet
of a watercourse or wetland or 500 feet of a reservoir; and (6)
the construction of all new gas stations.296 In order to pro-
vide the local communities input into the planning and ap-
proval process, the Regulations allow state, county, and local
officials to make recommendations to the City.297
9. Regulation of Hazardous Substances
No new DEC registered tanks are permitted within 100
feet of a watercourse or 500 feet of a reservoir. 298 Owners of
such tanks located between 100 feet and 250 feet of a water-
course, must (1) provide a copy of the state tank registration
form before installation; (2) design a plan using best manage-
ment practices, as required under state law, to prevent or
minimize the release of hazardous substances; and (3) meet
all other requirements of the state's hazardous substances
tank regulations. 299
294. See id. § 18-39(a)(7)(i).
295. See WATERSHED REGULATIONS, supra note 270, § 18-39(b)(3).
296. See id.
297. See id. §§ 18-39(a)(3),(4),(7),(8),(11).
298. See id. § 18-32(b).
299. See id. § 18-31(c)(1).
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10. Regulation of Petroleum' Storage
The Regulations prohibit the building of new gas stations
within 100 feet of a watercourse or 500 feet of a reservoir.30 0
New tanks that are exempted from state registration are not
permitted within twenty-five feet of a watercourse or 300 feet
of a reservoir, unless the limiting distance would preclude the
continuation of an existing business.301 Similarly, new tanks
requiring state registration under state law are not permitted
within 100 feet of a watercourse or 500 feet of reservoir, un-
less the applicant demonstrates that the ban would preclude
the continuation of an existing business.30 2 New home heat-
ing oil tanks within 100 feet of a watercourse or 500 feet of a
reservoir must be aboveground or in the basement.3 0 3 How-
ever, the above distances do not apply to the replacement in
kind of existing tanks.30 4
11. Pesticides and Fertilizers Working Groups
The Watershed Agreement provides for the establish-
ment of a Pesticide and Fertilizer Working Group to analyze
the state's regulations on the storage, use and application of
fertilizers and pesticides.305 Within six months after receiv-
ing the final report of the Working Group, the state shall de-
velop, in consultation with DEP, training materials to be
incorporated into the state's pesticide applicator certification
program that informs the applicators of the potential of con-
tamination from improper application.30 6
12. Watershed Protection and Partnership Council
One of the most innovative features of the Watershed
Agreement is the creation of the Watershed Protection and
300. See WATERSHED REGULATIONS, supra note 270, § 18-34(b).
301. See id. § 18-34(d).
302. See id. § 18-34(b). This is another illustration of the balancing of envi-
ronmental protection against economic sustainability.
303. See id. 18-34(c).
304. See id. § 18-33(e)(3).
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Partnership Council (WPPC).307 Envisioned as a forum for
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), the purpose of the
WPPC is to provide a permanent, regional forum to aid in
long-term Watershed protection and enhancement of the eco-
nomic vitality of the Watershed communities. 308
The WPPC will be broadly based with members coming
from all the stakeholders: New York City, the Coalition of
Watershed Towns, New York State, certain environmental
groups, and the EPA.309 Structurally, the Partnership will
have several committees, including an Executive Commit-
tee,310 a Technical Advisory Committee3 "', an East of Hudson
Advisory Committee, 312 and an East of Hudson Sporting Ad-
visory Committee.31 3
The WPPC and its constituent committees will serve as a
forum for discussions and developing recommendations relat-
ing to Watershed protection and environmentally responsible
economic development. By soliciting input from all the inter-
ested parties, including the public, the WPPC will review and
assess Watershed protection efforts regarding the watershed
and drinking waters supply, and provide a dispute resolution
mechanism among the parties.314
Specifically, on October 1, 1999, the Executive Commit-
tee of the WPPC will conduct a review of the parties' compli-
ance with the terms of the Agreement, including the
Watershed Regulations, Watershed Land Acquisition pro-
gram, and other Watershed Protection Programs contained in
the Agreement. 31 5 Pursuant to the review, the Executive
Council will provide recommendations to the City, State, and
EPA regarding modifications of any programs. 31 6
307. See id. para. 97.
308. See id.
309. See id. paras. 99, 104.
310. See WATERSHED AGREEMENT, supra note 270, para. 100.
311. See id. para. 99.
312. See id.
313. See id.
314. See id. para. 101.




One of the most important functions of the WPPC is its
responsibility to conduct a five year review of the implemen-
tation of the Watershed Regulations, the Watershed Land Ac-
quisition Program, any comprehensive water quality
monitoring, and Watershed Protection and Partnership
Programs.317
13. Catskill Watershed Corporation
Another innovative approach to promoting comity and
fostering cooperation is the creation of the CW Corporation.
The parties agree that in order to establish a working part-
nership between the City and the west of Hudson communi-
ties, and to carry out the many Watershed Protection and
Partnership Programs, an independent and locally adminis-
tered not-for-profit corporation will be established. The CW
Corporation will consist of the following 15 members:31 8
- six members representing Delaware County;
- two members representing Ulster County;
- two members representing Greene County;
- one member representing Schoharie County;
- one member representing Sullivan County;
- two members appointed by the Governor, one of which
will be chosen from a listing of three possible members sub-
mitted by the environmental community;
- one member appointed the Mayor of the City of New
York.
The CW Corporation shall administer 319 money paid by
the City for programs in sewage treatment infrastructure for
towns, villages and hamlets;3 20  sewer extensions; 321
stormwater retrofits that are necessary to correct or reduce
existing erosion and/or pollutant loading.322 The CW Corpo-
ration will also administer $31.7 million for the construction
317. See id. para. 105(c).
318. See id. para. 117(b).
319. See id. para. 118(a)(1).
320. See WATERSHED AGREEMENT, supra note 270, para. 122.
321. See id. para. 123.
322. See id. para. 125.
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of new stormwater controls3 23 and $3 million for the construc-
tion of septic systems required solely to comply with the re-
quirements of the Watershed Regulations on subsurface
treatment systems.324 The CW Corporation will make final
determinations as to the funding of Qualified Economic De-
velopment Projects authorized under the Catskill Fund for
the Future program. 325
14. Watershed Protection & Partnership Programs
The Watershed Protection and Partnership Programs in-
clude the City's and state's investment in the Watershed, in-
cluding a host of programs designed to remediate existing
adverse impacts on water quality as well as programs to pre-
vent adverse impacts to water quality in the future. New
York City has committed more than $270 million to the area
west of the Hudson River for water quality protection and
partnership programs and an additional $126 million for the
area east of the Hudson River.3 26 Combined, these water
quality protection and partnership programs include almost
$300 million for pollution prevention efforts, such as the up-
grade of all 105 public and privately-owned sewage treatment
plants; septic system maintenance and rehabilitation; 327 the
construction of new centralized sewage systems and exten-
sion of sewer systems to correct existing problems;328
stormwater management measures;329 public education;330
improved storage of sand, salt, and de-icing materials; 33 1 and
stream corridor protection projects.3 32
323. See id. para 128(a).
324. See id. para. 129(a),(b).










15. State Pollution Discharge Elimination System
Permit Upgrades
State Pollution Discharge Elimination System (SPDES)
permits, issued by DEC, require WWTPs to meet certain dis-
charge benchmarks in order to continue operation. 333 The
Watershed Agreement requires the City to provide up to $5
million to assist existing public and private wastewater treat-
ment plants to rehabilitate, replace or upgrade equipment to
allow the WWTP to meet SPDES permit requirements.
334
The New York State Environmental Facilities Corporation
(NYSEFC), in consultation with the City, will manage this
Partnership Program.3 35
16. New Sewage Treatment Infrastructure Facilities
The City also is providing $75 million for the construc-
tion and installation of WWTPs or community septic systems
or creation and funding of septic districts in communities
west of the Hudson River.3 36 Any WWTPs constructed must
discharge subsurface, to the extent practicable. The City, in
consultation with the community and CW Corporation, will
determine the appropriate project for the community, esti-
mate the cost of the project, and allocate fqnds for construc-
tion. The CW Corporation will administer and disburse the
funds for the creation of any septic districts.3 3 7 NYSEFC will
administer and disburse the funds for the construction of new
infrastructure 338 and will serve as a resource for the commu-
nities on the project.
17. Sewer Extensions
Ten million dollars will be provided by the City for the
construction of sewer extensions to City-owned WWTPs in ar-
eas where sewering is necessary to alleviate existing water
quality problems and reduce the reliance on failing or soon-
333. N.Y. ENVrL. CONSERV. LAW § 17-0809 to 17-0815.
334. See WATERSHED AGREEMENT, supra note 270, para. 121.
335. See id.
336. See id. para. 122.
337. See id. para. 122(m)(i).
338. See id. para. 122j).
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to-be failing septic systems.339 The City, in consultation
with the community and the CW Corporation, will select
projects and allocate funds based on the priority of the water
quality problems to be addressed. 340
Communities together with City technical staff, will
identify areas to be served. Communities will adopt a sewer
use ordinance, a comprehensive plan, subdivision regula-
tions, and appropriate land use laws and ordinances that as-
sure that future growth can be adequately serviced by the
sewer connection. 341 The City will serve as program manager
for this Partnership Program. 342
18. Stormwater Retrofits
New York City is providing $7.625 million for a program
to design, permit, administer, construct, implement, and
maintain stormwater best management practices (BMPs) to
address existing stormwater run-off in certain areas in order
to correct or reduce existing erosion and pollution.343 The
CW Corporation and the City, in consultation with the locali-
ties, will select and prioritize sites. 344 The CW Corporation
will act as program manager of this Partnership Program
and will oversee, construction and implementation of the
BMPs and disburse program funds. 3 4 5
19. Future Stormwater Controls for Single Family
Homes, Small Businesses and Low-Income
Housing
The City will pay the costs of designing and implement-
ing stormwater pollution prevention measures pursuant to
individual stormwater permits required by the Regula-
tions 346 for new individual residences constructed within the




343. See id. para. 125(a).
344. See WATERSHED AGREEMENT, supra note 270, para. 125(c)(ii).
345. See id. para. 125(c)(i).
346. See WATERSHED REGULATIONS, supra note 270, § 18-39(e)(1).
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buffer distances when lot constraints prevent the construc-
tion outside the buffer.3 47 Additionally, the City will pay 50%
of the costs of designing and implementing stormwater pollu-
tion prevention plans required by the Regulations for all
small businesses3 48 Small businesses are defined as New
York State resident businesses that are independently owned
and operated and employ 100 people or less.349 The City will
pay the costs of designing and implementing stormwater pol-
lution prevention plans required by the Regulations for facili-
ties funded through publicly-subsidized low income housing
projects. 350
20. West of Hudson Stormwater Fund
The City is providing $31.7 million for a program to de-
sign, construct, implement, and maintain new stormwater
measurements identified by stormwater pollution prevention
plans required by the Watershed Regulations.3 51 The CW
Corporation will act as program manager for this Partnership
Program. 352
21. Sand and Salt Storage Facilities
The Watershed Agreement calls for the City to provide
$10.25 million to improve the storage of sand, salt, and other
road de-icing materials to better protect water quality and as-
sist local governments in complying with the Watershed Reg-
ulations.353 Funds can be used to upgrade existing and
construct new sand and salt storage facilities.3 54 The CW
Corporation, in consultation with localities and the City, will
select and prioritize sites and allocate funds.355 The CW Cor-
poration will act as program manager for this Partnership
347. See WATERSHED AGREEMENT, supra note 270, para. 145(a)(i).
348. See id. 145(a)(ii).
349. See id.
350. See id. para. 145(a)(iii).
351. See id. para. 128(a).
352. See WATERSHED AGREEMENT, supra note 270, para. 128(c)(i).
353. See id. para. 126(a).
354. See id. para. 126(b).
355. See id. para. 126(c)(ii).
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Program and will oversee construction and installation of
such facilities as well as disburse funding.3 56
22. Stream Corridor Protection
Three million dollars is provided by the City for a pro-
gram to design, construct, and implement stream corridor
protection projects such as stream stabilization and fish
habitat improvements. 357 The City will act as program man-
ager for this Partnership Program and administer and dis-
burse such funds.3 58 The City, in consultation with the
Coalition of Watershed Towns, will select and design and al-
locate funds for the projects.359
23. Alternate Design Septic Systems
Another $3 million is provided by the City for the design,
construction, and installation costs of fill material and pump-
ing apparatus in connection with the installation of alternate
design septic systems.3 60 The funding of costs is intended to
off-set the requirements of the Watershed Regulations.3 61
The CW Corporation will act as program manager for this
Partnership Program to administer and disburse funding.3 62
An alternate design septic system is a system that be-
cause of site conditions requires either or both of the follow-
ing to comply with the Watershed Regulations: (1) the
importation and deposit of fill material beyond what is re-
quired to meet State or local regulations, and/or (2) the in-
stallation of apparatus to pump septic effluent upgrade to an
absorption field when recommended or required by the
City. 363
356. See id. para. 126(c)(i).
357. See WATERSHED AGREEMENT, supra note 270, para. 127(a),(b).
358. See id. para. 127(c).
359. See id. para. 127(c)(i).
360. See id. para. 129.
361. See id. para. 129(b).
362. See WATERSHED AGREEMENT, supra note 270, para. 129(d)(i).
363. See id. para. 129(c).
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24. Forestry Management Program
Five hundred thousand dollars is provided by the City for
a forestry management program to fund programs and
projects intended to promote forestry practices that protect
the City's water supply against run-off and other pollution.
364
The Watershed Agricultural Council will act as program
manager for this Partnership Program and will select
projects and administer and disburse funding.365
25. Public Education
Two million dollars is provided by the City for a program
of public education on the nature and importance of the City's
water supply system and the critical role of Watershed resi-
dents as stewards of their water quality.366 Up to one million
dollars can be used to establish and maintain exhibits on the
City's water supply and the Watershed at a regional museum
located west of the Hudson River. 367 The CW Corporation,
acting as program manager, will establish an advisory group
of educators and educational institutions to recommend ap-
propriate programs and projects for funding.368
26. Catskill Fund for the Future
The Watershed Agreement requires the City to provide
$75 million for the Catskill Fund (Fund) for the Future to be
paid over fifteen years.369 The payment schedule has been
accelerated to six years and the equivalent present value is
set at $59.9 million.3 70 The Fund will be used to provide loans
and grants for responsible, environmentally sensitive eco-
nomic development projects which encourage environmen-
tally sound development and the goals of Watershed
protection and job growth west of the Hudson River.371
364. See id. para. 13(a)(b).
365. See id. para. 130(c)(i).
366. See id. para. 131(a).
367. See WATERSHED AGREEMENT, supra note 270, para. 131(a).
368. See id. para. 131(c)(ii).
369. See id. para. 135(a).
370. See id. para. 135(e)(ii).
371. See id. para. 135(c).
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The CW Corporation will make the final decision on
whether to fund a proposed project under the program3 72
although, NYSEFC will act as the program manager for this
Partnership Program.373 The CW Corporation, in consulta-
tion with localities and the City, will select and prioritize
sites and allocate funds.3 7 4
27. Upgrades to Existing WWTPs
The City will pay the incremental costs, including annual
operation and maintenance of all upgrades required solely by
the Watershed Regulations, incurred by public and private
WWTPs in operation or permitted and under construction as
of November 2, 1995.375 The upgrades will include equip-
ment and processes required solely by the Watershed Regula-
tions.3 76 NYSEFC will be the program manager for this
Partnership Program.3 77
28. Payment of Costs and Expenses Associated with
the Review of City's Watershed Protection
Program
The City is providing $1.535 million to the Coalition of
Watershed Towns for reimbursement of costs and expenses
incurred in reviewing and responding to the City's Watershed
protection programs.3 78 The City will also provide $750,000
and $300,000 to Putnam and Westchester Counties, respec-
tively, for the same purposes. 379
29. Good Neighbor Payments
In recognition of the past sacrifices made by the Water-
shed communities, $9.675 million is provided by the City to
the municipalities that sign the Agreement to establish a bet-
372. See WATERSHED AGREEMENT, supra note 270, para. 135(f).
373. See id. para. 135 (e)(v),(vi).
374. See id. para. 135.
375. See id. para. 141(a).
376. See id.
377. See WATERSHED AGREEMENT, supra note 270, para. 146(d)(i).
378. See id. para 146 (a)(i).
379. See id. para. 146(a)(ii),(ii).
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ter working relationship with communities in order to protect
water quality.380 Good Neighbor Payments can be used to
pay the costs of public works or public improvements and
purchasing public equipment that will benefit the public at
large. 381 The Coalition of Watershed Towns, Putnam County
and Westchester County will disburse the funds for this Part-
nership Program.382
30. Local Consultation in the Land Acquisition
Process
Up to $20,000 is provided by the City to each town and
village in the Catskill and Delaware Watershed to them in
the review of the parcels and conservation easements the
City proposes to purchase. 383 The Coalition of Watershed
Towns or the CW Corporation will disburse the funds for this
Partnership Program.384
31. East of Hudson Water Quality Investment
Program
The City will provide sixty eight million dollars for the
costs of designing, planning, environmental assessment, per-
mitting, acquisition, financing, constructing, and installing of
facilities necessary for water quality protection. 385 Thirty
eight million dollars will be distributed to Westchester
County and Putnam County will receive thirty million
dollars.3 86
III. Conclusion
The New York City Watershed Agreement is a commit-
ment of historic proportions. New York City's financial com-
mitments to land acquisition, Partnership Programs, and
infrastructure and water quality improvements totals over
380. See id. para. 147(a).
381. See id. para. 147(b)(iii).
382. See WATERSHED AGREEMENT, supra note 270, para. 147.
383. See id. para. 148(a)(i).
384. See id. para. 148(c).
385. See id. para. 140.
386. See id. para. 140(f).
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$1.2 billion. New York State commitments to land acquisi-
tion and Partnership Programs amount to more than $53
million and federal commitments under the 1996 Safe Drink-
ing Water Act Amendments total $105 million.
This level of financial commitment represents New York
City's understanding that the financial burden of clean drink-
ing water should be borne primarily by those who enjoy it.
The financial package mandated by the Watershed Agree-
ment constitutes a needed injection of market forces in the
distribution of water. Water waste has been a significant
problem since the days of the first Croton Dam. It is hoped
that having New York City actually bear the cost of its water
will induce a more responsible use of resources within the
watershed.
Even with the substantial financial assistance extended
by the City, the Watershed communities bear the cost of fore-
gone development in economically advantageous but environ-
mentally sensitive land. Those communities have survived
under the sometimes onerous burden of New York City's need
for clean water and should be commended for their
perseverance.
68http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/6
